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FOREWORD 
by Michael Barletta 
Coordinator, Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group 
 
The George W. Bush Administration confronts a daunting array of challenges ensuing from the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which pose grave threats to the United States at 
home and to its allies and friends abroad. Increasingly, national policies and international institutions 
designed to cope with WMD threats are being outpaced by technical and political changes that under-
mine the effectiveness of existing measures to reduce WMD risks. Moreover, domestic pressures in key 
statesnotably China, France, India, Russia, and the United Statesmake it increasingly difficult to 
reach consensus and generate political will for effective collaboration against WMD proliferation. For-
tunately, however, the new administration can rely in part upon the military alliances, diplomatic ar-
rangements, and other political and economic instruments developed by the last ten U.S. presidents, 
who have labored since 1945 to constrain the spread of dangerous technologies in order to defend the 
United States and help construct a safer world. 
To build upon past efforts and successfully meet present and future WMD challenges, President 
Bush and his senior foreign policy advisors must make a number of decisions apt to hold fateful con-
sequences. They will face critical choices on managing U.S. foreign relations, thwarting WMD terror-
ism, and organizing the U.S. government to combat proliferation threats and exploit nonproliferation 
opportunities. This concise collection offers pragmatic guidance for the Bush team in each of these 
areas. It includes papers prepared for consideration by the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group 
in its 15-16 March 2001 meeting at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, 
DC, and a thematic review of the groups deliberations. A list of Strategy Group members and other 
specialists and policymakers who participated in the session concludes this publication. 
The Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group is an international body of veteran policymakers 
and prominent analysts who are working to craft innovative but practical measures to remedy WMD 
proliferation threats. A synopsis of the Strategy Groups efforts and associated publications are avail-
able online at http://cns.miis.edu/research/mnsg/index.htm. 
This publication and other activities of the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group have been 
made possible in part through the generous support of The Ford Foundation, Jill and Jeff Harris, The 




ABM  anti-ballistic missile 
ACDA  U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
AF   Agreed Framework (between the DPRK and USA) 
AMD   allied missile defense 
ASATs  anti-satellite weapons 
AVLIS  atomic vapor laser isotope separation 
BMD  ballistic missile defense 
BSE  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
BW   biological weapons 
BWC  Biological Weapons Convention 
CBW   chemical and biological weapons 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
CTBTO  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 
CTR  cooperative threat reduction 
CW   chemical weapons 
CWC  Chemical Weapons Convention 
DOD  U.S. Department of Defense 
DOE  U.S. Department of Energy 
DPRK  Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea 
ETRI  Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative 
FMCT  fissile-material cutoff treaty 
FSU  former Soviet Union 
G-8   Group of Eight 
GAO  U.S. Government Accounting Agency 
GPALS  global protection against limited strikes 
HEU  highly enriched uranium 
HHS  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM   intercontinental ballistic missile 
IMS  International Monitoring System (for nuclear testing) 
INF   Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
ISTC  International Science and Technology Center 
IWG  interagency working group 
KEDO  Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 
km   kilometer 
 iv 
kt    kiloton 
LLNL  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
LWR  light-water reactor 
MEPhI  Moscow Engineering Physics Institute 
MGIMO  Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MNSG   Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group 
MPC&A   materials protection, control, and accounting 
MT   metric ton 
MTCR   Missile Technology Control Regime 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NBC  nuclear, biological, and chemical 
NBC/M  nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile 
NGO  non-governmental organization 
NIS  Newly Independent States 
NMD  national missile defense 
NPT  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NSA  U.S. National Security Agency 
NSC  U.S. National Security Council 
NSG  Nuclear Suppliers Group 
NWFZ  nuclear-weapon-free zone 
OPCW  Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
P-5   Permanent Five (members of U.N. Security Council) 
PRC  Peoples Republic of China 
Pu   plutonium 
R&D  research and development 
ROK  Republic of Korea 
SDI  Strategic Defense Initiative 
START  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
TMD   theater missile defense 
UNMOVIC  United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (on Iraq) 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
UNSCOM  United Nations Special Commission (on Iraq) 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WA   Wassenaar Agreement 
WMD  weapons of mass destruction 
WPC&A  weapons protection, control, and accounting 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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U.S. ALLIES AND FRIENDS: 
MAINTAINING PRODUCTIVE TIES IN NONPROLIFERATION 
by Nobuyasu Abe 
Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna* 
 
The international nonproliferation regimes 
appear to be falling apart at the seams. The 
NPT-centered regime failed to stop India and 
Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons, and 
both countries continue weapons development. 
The inspection regime against WMD in Iraq has 
been long suspended, with no sign of its re-
sumption. North Korea continues missile de-
velopment, and suspicion persists about its 
WMD capabilities. People are starting to ques-
tion the value of observing nonproliferation 
norms if we cannot even stop the sale of nu-
clear reactors to India and Iran, or of missiles to 
Pakistan and other countries of concern. 
This paper outlines what needs to be done 
by the United States at each of three tiers of the 
international regimes: multilateral nonprolifera-
tion agreements, supplier export controls, and 
country-specific measures. 
MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN 
MULTILATERAL NON-
PROLIFERATION REGIMES 
(1) Sustain the viability of the NPT as the 
cornerstone of nuclear nonproliferation. Its 
basic bargain is abstinence from nuclear 
weapons on the part of non-nuclear 
weapon states, coupled with commitment 
to nuclear disarmament on the part of nu-
clear weapon states. There is a considerable 
dissatisfaction, however, among the non-
nuclear weapon states. 
(2) Demonstrate visibly that the U.S.-Russia 
nuclear weapons reduction process is pro-
gressing, either by negotiated agreement 
(START) or through unilateral steps. 
                                                 
* The views presented here are the authors 
own personal opinions, and do not necessarily 
reflect those of any governmental or non-
governmental organization. 
(3) Initiate negotiations on a Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty. 
(4) Ratify and bring into force the CTBT. In 
doing so, maintain robust national technical 
means of verification, because these will 
continue to provide strong support for the 
multilateral International Monitoring Sys-
tem (IMS). Some analysts may still argue 
that the IMS is not dependable, but it 
should not be expected to bear the entire 
responsibility for verification; indeed, the 
CTBT presumes the use of national means. 
Even without any IMS, the Treaty is worth 
putting into force. 
(5) Support the IAEA as an important NPT 
verification entity. Do not ask to apply the 
new 22% ceiling to the U.S. contribution. 
Rather, use this ceiling as a bargaining chip 
to demand that other Member States be 
more forthcoming in their contributions to 
the IAEA. 
(6) Urge the remaining NPT holdouts (India, 
Pakistan, Israel and Cuba) to join the treaty, 
but avoid providing undue rewards: i.e., le-
gitimizing their nuclear status, or opening 
the flow of sensitive technology to them. 
(7) Support steady implementation of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention by the 
OPCW. Urge holdouts in the Middle East 
and Asia (especially North Korea) to join 
the Treaty. 
(8) Work to expedite negotiation of a BWC 
verification protocol that is not excessively 
burdensome to bio/pharmaceutical indus-
tries, but still as tough as possible to be able 
to detect such clandestine efforts to acquire 
BW as those employed by Iraq. While mak-
ing every effort to conclude negotiations 
before the 5th Review Conference of the 
BWC in November 2001, seek to avoid 
hasty compromise for the sake of conclud-
ing negotiations. 
U.S. Allies and Friends: Maintaining Productive Ties in Nonproliferation 
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(9) Proceed with extreme caution regarding the 
Russian-proposed international missile 
warning mechanism. The notification re-
quirement alone may justify missile devel-
opment by countries of concern yet have 
no effect on restraining them. A worldwide 
agreement to restrict missile development is 
very hard to foresee. Countries will not ac-
cept another NPT to ban missiles that al-
lows those who already have them to 
continue their possession. Regional ar-
rangements in Middle East, South Asia or 
on the Korean Peninsula may have a better 
chance of success. 
However strong we try to make them, mul-
tilateral instruments remain products of com-
promise. Avoid becoming complacent with 
reliance just on multilateral regimes. Try to 
supplement them with a series of other steps. 
STRENGTHEN EXPORT CONTROL 
REGIMES OF LIKE-MINDED 
COUNTRIES 
The NSG, AG, MTCR, and WA (Was-
senaar Agreement) nonproliferation regimes are 
basically voluntary and still have difficulty 
tightening their common export guidelines, or 
coping with efforts to undermine their effec-
tiveness. 
(1) Draw up a strategy to handle the minimal-
ists such as Russia (and France), and carry 
it out tenaciously. (By minimalists I refer 
to those members of the NSG, AG, or 
MTCR who try to interpret these regimes 
guidelines so as to minimize their export 
control obligations, and who try to resist 
any efforts to strengthen controls. An eco-
nomically stricken country like Russia has 
strong internal pressures to export weapons 
and technology.) Combine this strategy 
with measures to help scientists and engi-
neers in sensitive areas, e.g., ISTC, and 
supporting conversion to civilian industries. 
(2) Consult with willing partners to seek fur-
ther supplementary measures, e.g., exchang-
ing intelligence, encouraging whistle-
blowers, and penalizing non-compliance. 
(These partners may include Britain, Japan, 
Canada, Australia, and possibly Germany.) 
(3) Give nonproliferation concerns due weight 
domestically, and avoid creating the im-
pression among partners that the United 
States may be putting its own commercial 
interests before solidarity with its allies. 
ADDRESSING SPECIFIC 
COUNTRIES OF CONCERN 
In general, negotiate from a position of 
strength, avoid hasty agreement, provide ade-
quate leverage to negotiators, and then secure a 
complete verification guarantee. Here I devote 
particular attention to the Korean Peninsula. 
North Korea 
Maintain the Agreed Framework and pro-
mote completion of KEDO-LWRs while insist-
ing on complete verification, including IAEA 
Safeguards compliance.  
Before renouncing nuclear deterrence 
against North Korea, remember that the coun-
try is strongly suspected to have CBW as well. 
Any missile deal has to be comprehensive: 
it must include renunciation of development, 
production, deployment and export of any me-
dium- and long-range ballistic missile, including 
the Nodong, and any deal should include thor-
ough verification comparable to that of the INF 
Treaty. 
(1) Any rewards have to be commensurate 
with the extent of North Korean coopera-
tion. 
(2) Involve allies (Japan and ROK) in close 
consultations on any deal, to dispel concern 
that the United States may go over their 
heads to strike a deal with North Korea. 
(3) Remember those who remain in concentra-
tion camps or are detained against their will 
before striking any comprehensive deal 
with North Korea. 
(4) In pursuing a comprehensive settlement of 
nonproliferation and other security and po-
litical issues in the region, the United States 
and Japan may use a six-nation framework. 
This would include all of the essential play-
ers in the region: the United States, Japan, 
Russia, China, ROK, and DPRK. Any 
nonproliferation arrangement through this 





specific, and thus it may be easier to secure 
the cooperation of Russia and China, who 
otherwise may resist the introduction or 
tightening of a new global nonproliferation 
requirement. 
India and Pakistan  
Resist the temptation to accept the fait ac-
compli. As already noted, refrain from reward-
ing proliferators. 
Iraq 
In order to prevent the erosion of the non-
proliferation regime, develop smart sanctions. 
In spite of all of the criticism, the best choice 
may be to hold on to the existing set of sanc-
tions and WMD verification requirements as 
long as possible, until the UNSC moves to on-
going monitoring and eventually to Iraqi par-
ticipation in the multilateral nonproliferation 
regimes. 
Iran 
Trust and verify. Encourage Iran to sign 
the IAEA Additional Protocol, and then insist 
on full verification and compliance with IAEA 
safeguards, the CWC, and the BWC Protocol. 
BACKUP MEASURES TO SUPPORT 
NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES 
However strong the multilateral arrange-
ments, like-minded country groupings, or coun-
try-specific measures may be, none of them 
alone is a panacea for addressing proliferation 
threats. Avoid a false sense of security. Nonpro-
liferation regimes can slow down proliferation 
but cannot entirely stop it. Other means have to 
be combined with the regimes: readiness to im-
pose sanctions, defense against WMD (i.e., 
counterproliferation), and ultimately means of 
deterrence (i.e., retaliation) once WMD are 
used. These measures can strengthen each 
other. The solution lies in a right mix of active 
and passive measures, four of which merit par-
ticular attention here. 
(1) Provide enough resources for nonprolifera-
tion efforts. Exempt nonproliferation-
related international organizations, i.e., the 
IAEA, OPCW, and CTBTO, from the 
scale of assessment reduction (down from 
25% to 22%), and continue and increase 
funding for ISTC and other physical pro-
tection efforts. 
(2) Initiate a new nonproliferation policy group 
among willing allies to coordinate efforts 
and share wisdom and resources, e.g., in 
designing smart sanctions such as pin-
pointed financial sanctions (seizing hidden 
financial assets), and encouraging and re-
warding defectors/whistle-blowers. 
(3) Strengthen counterproliferation measures, 
which may include missile defense. In this 
regard, pursue missile defense in a way that 
would improve the security environment 
and reduce WMD risks, e.g., combine mis-
sile defense with mutual WMD reductions 
and/or reduction/delay in WMD employ-
ment doctrines. Missile defense would be 
beneficial if it can promote reductions of 
WMD stockpiles and reduce alert status of 
WMD deployments. 
(4) Retain the nuclear deterrence option until 
such time as the WMD capabilities of 
countries of concern are resolved.
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TIME FOR CLARIFICATION 
IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
by Thérèse Delpech 
Atomic Energy Commission, France 
 
Although nonproliferation is perceived in 
Europe as primarily an American invention, it 
was adopted by European nations gradually 
over the last four decades. The nonproliferation 
fight became a diplomatic objective and a grow-
ing security concern for both the United States 
and its friends and allies in Europe, and respec-
tive policies became increasingly intertwined. 
Hence the current doubt about U.S. willingness 
to continue playing its traditional leading role in 
nonproliferation has opened a phase of uncer-
tainty in Europe. 
In the transatlantic relationship, there are a 
number of outstanding politico-military issues, 
some of which have direct or indirect bearing 
on nonproliferation. First, the European De-
fense Policy will make Europe increasingly ca-
pable of taking care of itself, allowing (at least in 
the best scenario) a new division of labor on 
security issues, but with more European in-
volvement than in the past. Second, the NMD 
debate will occasion serious consultations be-
tween Washington and the European allies. The 
real weight of European nations on this ques-
tion is unknown, but thought to be limited. 
Nevertheless, it will depend greatly on the qual-
ity of the European response. Finally, among 
the three prominent regional security issues
the Balkans, Middle East, and Russiathe lat-
ter two at least have a significant nonprolifera-
tion dimension. 
Therefore, it is now time for clarification 
on two accounts: U.S. nonproliferation policy, 
and Europes share in nonproliferation initia-
tives. 
NONPROLIFERATION 
Nonproliferation is critically important for 
both Europe and the United States. However, 
three differences shape respective postures in 
distinctive ways. 
General Policy Orientation 
European countries are parties to all major 
nonproliferation treaties, united in their support 
of multilateral treaties, and concerned about 
rising skepticism toward treaty-based arms con-
trol in the United States. Europeans states are 
ready to accept tailored agreements in some 
cases (e.g., to support KEDO). They are also 
ready to contemplate a number of additional 
measures, if such steps are meant to supple-
ment treaties, but Europeans perceive multilat-
eral accords to be an essential part of their 
security. 
Geography 
Much of the worlds proliferation-related 
activity is taking place in the Middle East, which 
is vitally important for Europe. The Mediterra-
nean region is one of the areas most closely 
monitored for proliferation activities. If the 
situation is not kept under control over the next 
fifteen to twenty years, Europe will be the first 
to suffer the negative consequences. However, 
Europe must consider a wider geographic per-
spective due to the current routes for sensitive 
sales, many of which transit from East Asia to 
the Middle East and Northern Africa (e.g., 
Chinas sales to Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
Libya; North Koreas sales to Iran, Syria, United 
Arab Emirates, and Egypt). 
Assessment 
Contrary to the United States, which pro-
duces proliferation assessments on a regular 
basis, Europe has no collective analysis on the 
subject. Reaching an objective and comprehen-
sive European assessment of the nature and 
magnitude of WMD proliferation and possible 
related threats would be no easy task. Much 
activity in this area is by nature clandestine, and 
Europe has yet to reach the stage where it could 





could balance the influence of U.S. estimates. 
The human and technical collection capabilities 
of European nations are highly dissimilar, and 
there is no regular comparison and refinement 
of data among respective national agencies. 
Hence, it is now time to produce a serious 
European threat assessment. 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
European and U.S. priorities are inverted 
regarding the role of counterproliferation. The 
U.S. Counter-Proliferation Initiative launched in 
December 1993 renewed attention to passive 
and active defense, but also emphasized 
counterforce options against hardened or un-
derground targets. Confusion soon emerged in 
Europe regarding the exact nature of the U.S. 
program. 
Today, there is increasing recognition in 
Europe that prudent defense planning is needed 
to address the possibility that Western forces 
may confront a regional adversary armed with 
NBC weapons on a future battlefield. This 
threat could lead Europeans in the coming 
years to improve significantly their surveillance, 
extended air defense, and early-warning capa-
bilities. 
Nonproliferation has always been a careful 
balancing act between international consensus 
building, and the development of defensive op-
tions should nonproliferation policy fail. 
Throughout the 1990s, one finds convincing 
signs of a gradual shift from the former to the 
latter in the United States. There has been no 
such shift, however, in Europe. Although sup-
port for counterproliferation has grown in the 
United States and will be an enduring feature of 
U.S. strategy, it remains a secondary priority in 
Europeif it is a priority at all. 
On the U.S. side, it appears that the large 
number of its military commitments abroad (a 
significant difference with the European States) 
contribute to the perceived need for an effec-
tive counterproliferation policy. 
HOMELAND DEFENSE:  
A FAMILIAR SONG 
We have a transatlantic debate on the sub-
ject of homeland defense once every decade: on 
SDI in the 1980s, GPALS in the 1990s, and 
NMD now. This time around, the growing con-
sensus for deployment of missile defenses be-
yond the current limits of the ABM treaty 
emerged in the United States at the end of the 
1990s, at a time when European nations were 
occupied with acquiring conventional force 
projection capabilities. The timing was there-
fore unfortunate, from the European view-
point. However, in recent months there has 
been a noteworthy evolution of debate on the 
subject in Germany and even in France. 
Although significant differences remain, 
there are possible areas of rapprochement. 
Europeans do not share the U.S. assessment of 
the threat (although they have no proper one 
themselves), nor do they believe it is necessary 
to deploy national or strategic defenses (al-
though they feel it is increasingly necessary to 
develop theater missile defenses for troop pro-
tection in an NBC environment). As noted 
above, Europe would benefit greatly from bet-
ter surveillance and proliferation analysis. 
Transatlantic consultations 
Although the new U.S. administration 
leaves no doubt concerning its firm intention to 
deploy missile defenses, it also insists on con-
sulting the allies before entering serious talks 
with Russia. Europeans will accept consulta-
tions on NMD, and participate actively in them. 
A linguistic shift indicates some accommoda-
tion in this incipient dialogue. To alleviate 
European concerns, U.S. officials may replace 
the disliked concept (and acronym) national 
missile defense (NMD) with allied missile 
defense (AMD) to respond to fear of decoup-
ling, or with ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
to blur the difference between NMD and 
TMD. 
Industrial Interests 
Participation in industrial development of 
the U.S. missile defense system is a tempting 
prospect for some European countries, their 
previous bitter experiences notwithstanding 
(i.e., with SDI). The statement by the German 
Chancellor of 27 February 2001 was clear on 
German interest, although the exact nature of 
envisaged collaboration is not certain (i.e., 
Time for Clarification in Transatlantic Relations 
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whether it would involve participation in the 
NMD architecture or joint TMD development). 
Remaining Questions 
Although London, and even Berlin and 
Paris, are softening their statements on missile 
defenses, important questions are still pending: 
How will discussions with Russia evolve? How 
will the relationship with China evolve? Is U.S. 
awareness rightly focused on the more pertinent 
aspects of the proliferation threat, or does the 
U.S. prioritization risk diverting energy and 
funds towards remote or speculative menaces? 
SPECIFIC CONCERNS 
Ballistic Missiles 
Missile programs increasingly drive other 
weapons programs and strategic considerations. 
They are therefore moving to the forefront of 
strategic transformation. While missile pro-
grams are seen as the greatest force determining 
deployment of BMD, European initiatives to 
improve the current MTCR regime (e.g., pro-
posed code of conduct) are looked upon with 
suspicion by the United States. European par-
ticipants should clarify the process initiated at 
the Helsinki MTCR meeting, while taking into 
account fears expressed, notably by Japan, that 
such measures could be used to legitimize mis-
sile proliferation. The lack of U.S. participation 
in the February 2001 meeting in Moscow on a 
Global Control System was seen widely in 
Europe as unnecessary and unhelpful, even if 
the meeting did not produce practical results. 
Chemical Weapons 
The Iraq-Iran war led the United States to 
give increased impetus to the Geneva negotia-
tions for a global ban on CW, but after the con-
clusion of negotiations in 1993 and entry into 
force of the CWC in 1997, implementation de-
cisions have eroded the conventions provisions 
for verification. There is also dissatisfaction in 
the OPCW regarding the national declarations 
of some significant countries, including Russia 
and Iran. 
Biological Weapons 
There is growing concern about BW in 
some European countries, due both to the ma-
jor clandestine programs unveiled in the USSR 
and Iraq, and to current scientific and techno-
logical advances. But the U.S. emphasis on BW 
terrorism is considered excessive in Europe. 
Another transatlantic difference is that while 
European nations are all in favor of adopting a 
BWC verification protocol, for industrial rea-
sons the United States has been one of the 
most difficult partners in the negotiation. With 
regard to both the CWC and BWC, we have yet 
to see satisfactory response to the proven cases 
of breaches in the conventions. 
Nuclear Weapons 
Whether made unilaterally or otherwise, re-
ductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal will be wel-
comed by all European nations. However, 
alleged plans to contemplate new roles for nu-
clear weapons* raise serious questions. If this 
means that the United States seeks to develop 
more usable nuclear weapons, it would be a 
major throwback to the Cold War. The U.S. 
Nuclear Posture Review is therefore anticipated 
with interest in Europe: a possible quest for 
new nuclear warheads would also raise doubt 
about the continuation of the U.S. test morato-
rium. 
CTBT 
In Europe, it is widely believed that there 
was more to the U.S. Senate vote against the 
CTBT than merely another example of domes-
tic politics intruding on the security agenda. 
Prospects for ratification are now seen as al-
most nonexistent. The U.S. posture toward the 
treaty is perceived in Europe as a symbol of 
U.S. skepticism toward multilateral approaches 
and international verification. 
                                                 
* For instance, in the apparently influential re-
port by the National Institute for Public Policy 
(NIPP), Rational and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear 






REGIONAL ISSUES  
Several regional issues may have become 
pivotal for transatlantic relations. The future of 
U.S.-Russia arms control agenda remains at the 
forefront, but Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and 
South Asian also pose important issues for 
U.S.-European relations. 
Russia 
Russia will remain a major concern for 
Europe, whatever position that Russia may 
have in the domestic U.S. security agenda. In 
the past, the most significant achievement of 
the U.S.-Russia negotiating process was far 
greater predictability in the behavior of both 
states. At a time when imbalance prevails be-
tween the two nations, predictability remains 
essential not only for the United States and 
Russia, but also for the rest of the world. It is 
widely assumed in Europe that the U.S. Coop-
erative Threat Reduction programs are useful 
and need continuous support. However, it is 
unclear whether the threat reduction and nu-
clear arms control agendas will converge. On 
the European side, initiatives towards Russia 
remain largely insufficient. The Common 
Strategy of the European Union on Russia 
adopted on 4 June 1999 includes under the 
heading Preventive Diplomacy an important 
section devoted to curbing the proliferation of 
WMD, and to supporting nuclear disarma-
ment and chemical destruction. Europeans 
could use this strategy to good effect in sup-
porting threat reduction in Russia, but have not 
provided adequate funding for this purpose. 
Iraq 
After Colin Powells February 2001 trip to 
the Middle East, there is rising support for a 
modified approach toward Iraq. Coming ten 
years after the Persian Gulf War, a revised ap-
proach is meant to refocus sanctions and pres-
sure on the Iraqi government and on weapons 
and significant dual-use items, and to lift sanc-
tions on consumer goods. It could also include 
compensation for countries in the region (and 
perhaps even Russia) to get new support for a 
modified approach. While the objectives are 
clearto refocus sanctions and rebuild the coa-
lition, particularly of the P5articulation of 
this policy with U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion 1284 is still unclear. In particular, the modi-
fied approach should in no way compromise or 
otherwise further delay the return of 
UNMOVIC inspectors to Iraq. 
Iran 
It may be time to engage Iran, but given the 
regional environment, the impact of engage-
ment on WMD programs is unclear, regardless 
of who rules Teheran. These programs are 
likely to continue, with missile development 
most probably being only the visible part of 
them. Russian sales to and cooperation with 
Iran are viewed with concern in European capi-
tals, as in the United States. 
North Korea 
Europe has never been on the forefront in 
coping with North Korea. However, Europeans 
concur with the main U.S. objectives: to sustain 
the current freeze on the Korean nuclear pro-
gram and missile testing. Major shared goals 
include stopping North Korean missile sales 
abroad, notably in the Middle East, and 
preserving the possibility of compliance with 
IAEA requirements. The question now fre-
quently asked in Europe is whether we are wit-
nessing the end of U.S. patience. 
South Asia 
Given the available nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles in the region, the first goal of 
any policy is to lower the likelihood of further 
conflicts. One significant way to do so would 
be to freeze the Line of Control and recognize 
it as an international border. 
CONCLUSION 
Now that the United States is demonstrat-
ing skepticism about multilateral arms control 
and nonproliferation initiatives, can Europeans 
take a more significant share in nonproliferation 
policies? Yes, because there is little alternative 
to doing so. Due to geography the stakes for 
Europe in coping with Russian nonproliferation 
challenges, for instance, are greater and more 
immediate than for the United States. Possible 
Russian withdrawal from the INF Treaty or the 
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possible reconfiguration of nuclear forces as a 
means to respond to missile defenses would 
directly affect European security, while more 
sensitive Russian exports to the Mediterranean 
region would affect Europe indirectly. Prolifera-
tion developments in the south and southeast 
of Europe are becoming a matter of concern, 
even if European responsibility in addressing 
and preventing unwelcome trends still needs to 
be fully recognized.  
But even in the best scenario, Europe will 
not be able to replace United States in this re-
spect. If U.S. officials do not confirm the con-
tinuing contribution of nonproliferation norms 
and multilateral arms control, there likely will be 
serious negative consequences; Washingtons 
support will remain essential for the regimes, 
whatever Europes own improvement in the 
field. This is particularly true with regard to 
China and Russia, which will only take advan-
tage of less U.S. commitment to further reduce 
their own commitment to nonproliferation poli-
cies and arms control. In both countries, 
treaties are often viewed either as unnecessary 
constraints or concessions to the United States, 






NORTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS: 
SOVIET AND RUSSIAN LEGACIES? 
by Timothy McCarthy 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a wonderful line in The Right Stuff 
where the narrator laments that U.S. rockets 
will never catch up with Soviet rockets because 
ours always blow up. But this judgment was 
too harsh for the 1950s and 1960s, and it re-
mains so today. History tells us that new rocket 
and missile development is fraught with diffi-
culties and often-spectacular failures, especially 
for first- and second-generation programs. 
Combine these inherently risky technological 
projects with an additional requirement to seri-
ally produce missiles for combat, and you en-
sure additional opportunities for malfunction or 
breakdown. The United States, Russia, China, 
Iraq, and others have all experienced this phe-
nomenon in their missile programs. In fact, and 
contrary to Tom Wolfes narrator, everyones 
rockets always blow up. 
Everyones, it seems, except those from 
North Korea. This paper proposes an alterna-
tive explanation why this may be so. It is based 
on an in-depth technical analysis forthcoming 
by the author in collaboration with Robert 
Schmucker, President of Schmucker Technolo-
gie (Munich).* In our effort to explain how 
North Korea has succeeded in realizing its bal-
listic missile ambitions, especially in terms of 
their short development times, successful serial 
production, and supposed lack of extensive 
foreign assistance, our research calls into ques-
tion the conventional assessment of the North 
Korean missile program. The paper concludes 
by suggesting implications for U.S. policy with 
respect to Russia and other missile proliferation 
issues. 
                                                 
* This paper offers an extremely abbreviated, 
general presentation of our findings. For further 
information regarding evidence, analysis, and 
implications of this ongoing research project, 
contact the author at tmccarthy@miis.edu. 
PUZZLES 
The available evidence indicates that the 
North Korean experience with missile devel-
opment differs substantially from that of every 
other country to date. Although hard data con-
cerning North Korean missile activities are dif-
ficult to come by in both the classified and 
unclassified realms, we can ascertain benchmark 
dates in the developmental history. These dates 
and assessments available in the public literature 
(which apparently reflect current classified 
analysis), suggest the following characteristics of 
North Korean missile programs: 
(1) North Korea has undertaken at least four, 
and possibly five, successful development 
and production programs in less than twenty 
years. 
(2) A very small number of samplesperhaps 
three or four missiles from Egypt
reportedly served as the basis of Pyongy-
angs first missile reverse-engineering pro-
gram. 
(3) There have been an exceedingly small 
number of flight testsprobably less than 
tenfor the entire missile development 
program. 
(4) There has been an absence of significant 
problems or failures with both tested and 
produced missiles. For example, Iranian 
missiles purchased from North Korea 
proved to be extremely reliable during the 
1988 War of the Cities. 
(5) Programs have manifested short develop-
ment-to-series production timelines; in 
some cases, production reportedly com-
menced prior to flight-testing. 
(6) There reportedly has been no extensive 
foreign assistance to the program. 
In sum, the North Korean experience ap-
pears completely unique in the history of mis-
sile development and production, especially 
North Korean Ballistic Missile Programs: Soviet and Russian Legacies? 
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when compared with the histories of other de-
veloping country programs. In many respects, 
Pyongyangs work can be described as success-
ful manufacturing immediately after drawing-
board activities are completed. Although this 
goal describes the theoretical intention of every 
missile project, such ideal results never happen 
in the real world. While the timing of failures 
cannot be predicted, they must be expected at 
some point in the process. Even with the exten-
sive application of management skills, re-
sources, theoretical predictive modeling, and 
proper quality-control means, the realization of 
a missile program is still characterized by a large 
amount of trial-and-error work. This holds true 
not only for the phases in which a basic, or pro-
totype, missile is establishedreverse engineer-
ing, improvement, or developmentbut also 
for qualification and production line accep-
tance. 
However, a missile program with very lim-
ited tests could rapidly attain successful produc-
tionif it were based on another, pre-existing 
system, and if extensive production and other 
assistance was obtained. 
MISSILE PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
We examine North Korean missile projects 
that involve reverse engineering (Scud-B), 
product improvement (the Scud-C) and indige-
nous development (Nodong). Although these 
systems differ in their technical characteristics, 
each has been successfully produced by 
North Korea. The numbers of systems ex-
ported and deployed indicates manufacture 
from a functioning production line, rather than 
on the basis of pilot, artisan-like production. 
Moreover, testing and combat use of North 
Korean-supplied missiles suggests a high degree 
of reliability from missiles supplied through 
North Korea. 
Most analysts tend to focus on missile de-
velopment and technology, because they are 
indispensable to any venture of this kind. While 
development contains inherent technical risks 
and failures, series production of missile sys-
tems is another, and very different hurdle that is 
usually overlooked in missile assessments. The 
objective of series production is the near-
flawless manufacture of systems in a reproduci-
ble process, and such a missile system must 
have a certain degree of reliability and must 
function according to specifications. This holds 
true for U.S., Russian, or North Korean mis-
siles. Therefore, proving a missile design is 
merely the first of several difficult steps on the 
road to extensively deploying and perhaps ex-
porting the system. 
To fully grasp the significance of the per-
formance of North Korean missile programs, it 
is necessary to understand the challenges in-
volved in indigenous development of new mis-
sile systems, and especially of reverse-
engineering existing missiles. 
REVERSE ENGINEERING 
Reverse engineering is often misunderstood 
relative to its complexity. By definition, it is 
based solely on the evaluation of existing prod-
uct samplesusually, as reportedly in the case 
with North Korea, without further manufactur-
ing information. From these samples, engineers 
must derive all information needed for devel-
opment and production so that an identical, 
reproducible product with respect to geometry, 
performance, function, and reliability can be 
manufactured.  
Analysts tend to view reverse engineering 
as an approach that allows one to quickly, and 
with only minor problems arrive at the final 
product. However, it must be stressed that: 
(1) A missile consists of thousands of ele-
ments; that is, effective reverse engineering 
must (almost exactly) copy and integrate 
every single part, sub-assembly, and assem-
bly. In the course of this process, identifica-
tion, derivation, and definition of required 
manufacturing technologies represents the 
critical and often decisive bottleneck, which 
also relates to the proper materials required 
for the process. Therefore, it is in the areas 
of manufacturing technology and material 
availability that a reverse-engineering effort 
usually falters. 
(2) Any deviation of one significant element
as opposed to say, the surface finish of a 
machined partwill affect the overall 
product. If and when there is any deviation, 
development work is required; this places 





ing for the manufacturing and integration 
processes. 
Therefore, due to limited knowledge of the per-
formance, tolerances, and functions of parts 
from original samples, reverse engineering re-
quires extensive work and a rather large number 
of samples to work with. This is especially true 
in the case of a country that has never before 
developed and produced a guided missile sys-
tem.  
In such cases, testing at the component and 
subsystem level (e.g., engine tests) becomes ex-
ceedingly important. However, static tests can-
not replace flight-testing, as the loads on the 
missile are completely different and often un-
predictable. Flight-testing provides experience 
not just for development, but also for informa-
tion on the handling and operation of the over-
all system. Finally, flight tests qualify generated 
results, in both the development and produc-
tion phases. Of course, a country could build a 
missile such that the engine burns and it lift off; 
however, a reproducible missile requires flight-
testing.  
Based on the experience of the Soviet Un-
ion, Iraq, and other countries, successful re-
verse engineering of a first- or second-
generation missile followed by system produc-
tion ordinarily has the following characteristics: 
• minimum required time not less than 7 to 8 
years 
• significant difficulties due to material avail-
ability and manufacturing technology 
• at least 30 to 50 samples required 
• foreign support indispensable 
• extensive testing required 
• many failures in the early phase 
• duplication of the original difficult to 
achieve 
• final result mostly similar but not identical 
to the original 
However, the North Korean experience with 
the Scud-B and Scud-C missiles differs in many 
important respectsparticularly in terms of 
flight-testingfrom the pattern evident in 
other cases of missile development. 
INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRODUCTION 
The Nodong represents the third genera-
tion of missile work in North Korea, and the 
missile is considered to be an indigenously de-
velopment. North Korea apparently began the 
Nodong program some time in the late 1980s. 
This missile program is roughly comparable in 
terms of size, performance, developmental 
stage, and national resource base to the Soviet 
R-5, Indian Prithvi, and Iraqi Al-Samoud. Charac-
teristics of a successful indigenous development 
and production activity of this type include: 
• seven or more years for missile develop-
ment and production 
• extensive testing required for proof and 
qualification 
• failures, especially in the early phases 
• number of flight tests typically on the order 
of tens of missiles 
• small number of tests required for a firing 
table 
In each these respects, one can find little simi-
larity between North Koreas indigenous mis-
sile work and that carried out by Iraq, India, the 
Soviet Union, or virtually any other country. 
WORKING HYPOTHESES 
Based on a development and production 
model consistent with the few known facts 
about the North Korean missile program, the 
well-established histories of similar programs, 
sound technical principles, and other informa-
tion, we conclude that: 
(1) It is unlikely that R-17/Scud-B missiles 
shipped in 1987 to Iran from North Korea 
were of indigenous North Korean origin. It 
is possible that the missiles were license-
produced. Given the time frames involved, 
however, it is now certainly possibleand 
perhaps likelythat North Korea can indi-
genously produce the missiles. 
(2) Similarly, initial Scud-Cs sold to Iran and 
Syria probably were not of original North 
Korean design and manufacture. However, 
North Korea now could probably produce 
the missiles. 
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(3) The Nodong missile is of Soviet design. 
Given the complexities of this new weapon 
system, the successful initial flight-tests in 
North Korea and elsewhere, and the rela-
tionship between Russian entities and 
North Korea, it is likely that some missiles 
(in whole or in part) or key hardware were 
shipped to North Korea. The exact ship-
ment routedirectly from Russia or 
through an intermediaryremains to be 
determined. The North Korean Nodong 
program has almost certainly relied exten-
sively on foreign assistance. 
These are preliminary conclusions; clearly, more 
research needs to be done on these and related 
issues. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Three policy implications of this analysis 
are particularly noteworthy: 
(1) The North Korean model is exceedingly 
troubling from a proliferation perspective. 
With the Nodong, for instance, Pyongyang 
has taken a (semi) qualified missile, tested it 
once, and deployed and exported the sys-
tem in an astoundingly short time. We 
therefore agree with one of the key conclu-
sions of the Rumsfeld Commissionthat 
countries can develop long-range missiles 
quicklyalthough we reach those conclu-
sions somewhat differently than did the 
public version of the Rumsfeld report. We 
also strongly agree with the reports view 
that foreign supply of ballistic missiles is 
not an unlikely wildcard, but instead a 
concrete reality. 
(2) North Koreas current missile negotiating 
position may be based on an internal as-
sessment that the program has reached a 
technical plateau, due in whole or in part to 
the lack of continuing Russian or other 
assistance to the program. 
(3) Greater attention needs to be paid to out-
dated Russian missile systems. A missile 
MPC&A initiative might be useful to de-
termine what technologies and equipment 
remain in warehouses, which might become 




U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: PRACTICAL MEASURES TO 
RESTORE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION 
by William C. Potter  
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
and Serguei Batsanov 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
 
BACKGROUND 
An unusual aspect of the Cold War was the 
parallelism, and often close consultation and 
cooperation, between the United States and 
Soviet Union on nuclear nonproliferation is-
sues. This cooperation generally persisted 
across both Republican and Democratic ad-
ministrations in the 1970s and 1980s and 
served, in many respects, as the cornerstone of 
the NPT and related nuclear export control 
regimes. It also was an important element of 
stability in an often-turbulent superpower rela-
tionship. 
Ironically, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the end of the Cold War have accentuated, 
and in some respects aggravated, strains in the 
nuclear nonproliferation partnership between 
Washington and Moscow. These strains are 
evident in major disputes over Russian nuclear 
exports to Iran and India, conflicting positions 
on Iraq and the role of UNMOVIC, the lack of 
sustained cooperation on important regional 
security issues in South Asia and the Middle 
East, fundamental differences over the nearly 
complete treaty for a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
(NWFZ) in Central Asia, and domestic political 
pressures in both countries to emphasize short-
term, economic and military considerations to 
the neglect of longer-term, international security 
and nonproliferation objectives. 
In the United States, the tendency to sub-
ordinate nonproliferation objectives to other 
economic and military aims is reflected in Con-
gressional opposition to the CTBT, pressure to 
abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty, and support for 
rapid enlargement of NATO. It also finds ex-
pression more generally in the growing politici-
zation of nonproliferation policymaking and the 
increasing inclination to view WMD prolifera-
tion as a defense planning challenge requiring 
military action, rather than primarily as an arms 
control or foreign policy problem susceptible to 
multilateral diplomacy. 
The tendency to subordinate nonprolifera-
tion objectives to economic and political con-
siderations is equally pronounced in Russia. It is 
evident in efforts to ease sanctions against Iraq, 
nuclear trade initiatives toward India and Iran, 
the demise of institutional advocates for nuclear 
export restraint, and growing doctrinal reliance 
on nuclear weapons, especially on tactical nu-
clear arms. Reinforcing these trends is growing 
Russian suspicion of U.S. strategic objectives 
and the perceived need to cultivate closer Rus-
sian ties with traditional allies, many of whom 
are U.S. adversaries and potential proliferators. 
OPTIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION 
Given the increasingly chilly state of U.S.-
Russian relations and the potential for major 
new bumps on the horizon, it is imperative to 
preserve what remains of U.S.-Russian coopera-
tion for nonproliferation and to explore means 
to reinvigorate cooperation. There are a number 
of concrete steps that might usefully be taken in 
this regard. 
Revive Biannual Consultations 
During the mid-1970s the United States 
and the Soviet Union initiated a series of con-
sultations on nuclear nonproliferation matters 
and often worked closely together in interna-
tional fora to tighten export restraints and gain 
greater adherence to the NPT. In the Reagan 
and Bush administrations these consultations 
included regular bilateral meetings held ap-
proximately every six months involving the U.S. 
Ambassador for Nonproliferation, other senior 
U.S. nonproliferation specialists, and their So-
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viet counterparts. Unfortunately, these regular, 
narrowly focused bilaterals have been replaced 
in recent years by the more diffuse, high-level 
Gore-Chernomyrdin/Primakov/et al. Commis-
sion. 
One low-cost but important step in reviv-
ing U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation 
is to resurrect biannual nonproliferation bilater-
als. It also would be desirable to revive the post 
of U.S. Ambassador for Nonproliferation, and 
to have the occupant of that post coordinate 
U.S. nonproliferation policy. On the Russian 
side, there is likewise a clear need for greater 
centralization of nonproliferation policymaking, 
perhaps in the Security Council, in order to re-
duce the influence of purely commercial con-
siderations. By themselves, these measures 
would not mend the unraveling of U.S.-Russian 
cooperation for nonproliferation, but they may 
be necessary conditions for concentrating bu-
reaucratic attention on the problems and pro-
viding a dedicated forum for addressing the 
difficulties. 
Expand Cooperation to Counter WMD 
Terrorism 
It is in the national security interests of 
both the United States and Russia to enhance 
cooperation to counter WMD terrorism. Little 
concrete progress, however, has been made to 
strengthen anti-terrorism collaboration, despite 
various summit proclamations to the contrary. 
Especially discouraging is the absence of mean-
ingful intelligence sharing regarding confirmed 
cases of illicit nuclear trafficking. One modest 
step to enhance cooperation would be to create 
and maintain under the auspices of the NATO-
Russia Permanent Joint Council a joint database 
on international terrorist incidents involving the 
acquisition, use, or threat to use weapons of 
mass destruction. 
Consolidate and Reduce HEU/Plutonium 
A priority for U.S.-Russian nonproliferation 
cooperation should be to reduce the quantity of 
fissile material that must be protected and the 
number of sites where fissile material is stored. 
As part of a joint U.S.-Russian program of con-
solidation and elimination, the United States, in 
partnership with Russia, should undertake to 
negotiate the purchase of all HEU known to 
reside at facilities in the non-Russian successor 
states, as well as Yugoslavia. Given the rela-
tively small but nevertheless significant quanti-
ties of weapons-usable material at sites in 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and 
Yugoslavia, a uranium buy-up approach to 
Soviet-origin material represents a low-cost, 
high-return nonproliferation strategy, which 
would reinforce U.S.-Russian cooperation. 
Use Education as a Nonproliferation Tool 
There is a tremendous gap today between 
government statements about the danger of 
WMD proliferation and the absence of funds 
allocated to train the next generation of 
nonproliferation specialists. Given this lack of 
support, it is not surprising that the United 
States, Russia, and the international community 
repeatedly fail to anticipate proliferation 
developments or to devise adequate non- 
proliferation strategies. 
One useful step that could be taken to re-
dress this problem would be passage of legisla-
tion to create a National Nonproliferation 
Education Act. Such legislationperhaps mod-
eled after the National Defense Education 
Actcould among other things provide fellow-
ships to U.S. and/or selected foreign graduate 
students for advanced multidisciplinary training 
in nonproliferation. Alternatively, private foun-
dations might provide funds for such fellow-
ships. 
Although Russia faces difficult budgetary 
constraints, its government similarly would do 
well to encourage the growth of nonprolifera-
tion education opportunities. At a minimum, it 
would be useful to introduce regular course 
offerings in the field at its major universities 
and expand formal coursework on the topic at 
the Russian Diplomatic Academy and the Mos-
cow State Institute of International Relations 
(MGIMO). 
New information and communication 
technologies afford opportunities to provide 
nonproliferation training to a larger audience, 
including personnel in Russias nuclear cities. 
The Monterey Institute and the Moscow Engi-
neering Physics Institute (MEPhI), for example, 
are discussing the possibility of offering lectures 
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and convening conferences on nonproliferation 
themes using a high-speed communications 
network. Because of MEPhIs ties with institu-
tions in many of Russias nuclear cities, expan-
sion of this collaboration could reach audiences 
in a number of different Russian regions. 
Foster Nonproliferation Norms 
Related to the task of nonproliferation edu-
cation is fostering the development of nonpro-
liferation norms and the growth of a 
nonproliferation culture among citizens and 
elected officials. NGOs are especially well-
positioned to perform this community-building 
function, which requires a sustained effort over 
an extended period of time. Dissemination of 
timely and reliable open-source information on 
nonproliferation matters is one means to facili-
tate the emergence of well-informed publics, as 
well as the development of independent non-
proliferation communities. It is also important 
to nurture the inchoate nonproliferation centers 
in Russias nuclear cities, which have the poten-
tial to develop into institutional advocates for 
prudent nonproliferation policy on such issues 
as strengthened export controls, enhanced safe-
guards, and treaty compliance. 
Implement NPT Commitments 
U.S.-Russian cooperation for nonprolifera-
tion is most apparent in the context of the NPT 
Review Process, where the two nuclear weap-
ons states frequently find considerable common 
ground vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon states. 
In the interim between the 2000 NPT Review 
Conference and the 2002 NPT PrepCom, Mos-
cow and Washington should identify and take 
expeditious action on at least several of the 13 
practical steps for disarmament and nonpro-
liferation agreed to in the Final Declaration of 
the 2000 NPT Review Conference. These might 
include ratification of the CTBT by the United 
States, completion and implementation of the 
Trilateral Initiative among the United States, 
Russia, and the IAEA, further reduction of 
non-strategic nuclear weapons (or perhaps codi-
fication of the 1991/92 parallel, unilateral decla-
rations), and the entry into force of START II, 
perhaps as part of a larger bargain involving 
 
 
tradeoffs among offensive and defensive sys-
tems. Joint promotion of completion and im-
plementation of the NWFZ in Central Asia also 
would indicate serious commitment to under-
take implementation of their NPT obligations. 
Collaborate on Stockpile Stewardship 
Siegfried Hecker, former director of Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, advocates a very 
different (and admittedly controversial) ap-
proach to facilitating U.S.-Russian nonprolifera-
tion cooperation. As part of a broader program 
of U.S.-Russian collaboration in the nuclear 
sector, Hecker proposes that the United States 
consider cooperative measures in the realm of 
stockpile stewardship. These include increasing 
exchanges regarding weapons safety and secu-
rity, joint research designed to allow both na-
tions to assure nuclear weapons reliability, and 
possibly conducting joint subcritical experi-
ments in the spirit of the Joint Verification Ex-
periments of 1988. Although these activities 
might be regarded as antithetical to the disar-
mament dimension of the NPT, they merit at-
tention as a possible means to enhance the 
prospect of U.S. ratification of the CTBT and 
to promote greater transparency between the 
Russian and U.S. nuclear weapon complexes. 
Multilateralize Nonproliferation Dialogue 
In some instances, nonproliferation objec-
tives may be served by supplementing a U.S.-
Russian dialogue on cooperation with other 
bilateral and multilateral discussions. It might 
be useful, for example, to introduce selected 
nonproliferation items into the G-8 agenda. 
Furthermore, establishment of a regular dia-
logue outside of the NPT process between the 
New Agenda Coalition and Russia and the 
United States might help raise the salience of 
Article VI issues in the nonproliferation bu-
reaucracies in both Washington and Moscow. 
Finally, more consideration should be given to 
engaging in a dialogue with Russia on nonpro-
liferation issues within the context of the 
Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Coopera-
tion, and Security between NATO and the Rus-
sian Federation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Given the Cold War origins of U.S.-
Soviet/Russian nonproliferation cooperation, 
one might question the relevance of such col-
laboration today. Does the United States really 
need Russian support to achieve its broad non-
proliferation objectives, and is it possible for 
Russia in its present situation to participate as 
an equal partner in pursuit of mutually accept-
able aims? In light of the many other channels 
of communication and consultation between 
Russia and the United States, is another channel 
dedicated to nonproliferation really necessary? 
We believe the answer to all three of these 
questions is definitely yes. Combating the 
spread of nuclear weapons remains in the best 
interests of both countries. Reinvigorating non-
proliferation may be helpful, moreover, in high-
lighting common ground at a time when there 
are many divergent interests. In addition, non-
proliferation cooperation is a useful means for 
Russia to balance its bilateral relationship with 
the United States, and to raise its profile as a 
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CHINAS PROLIFERATION POLICIES 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
by Harry Harding 
George Washington University 
 
As the Bush Administration enters office, 
its policy toward China is shaped by four 
themes in its foreign policy platform: 
(1) To treat China as a strategic competitor, 
rather than as either a strategic partner or a 
strategic adversary.  
(2) To proceed with a national missile defense 
system (NMD) for the United States, so as 
to enhance Americas security against at 
least a limited missile attack. 
(3) To establish a firmer commitment to the 
security of Taiwan, possibly to include the 
provision of theater missile defense (TMD) 
to the island. 
(4) To base its foreign policy upon a closer 
relationship with its allies, both in Asia and 
elsewhere. 
On balance, if these four pledges are re-
deemed, they will have a significant negative 
impact on Chinas proliferation policies, both 
vertical and horizontal. That is, they will en-
courage China to build up its own strategic 
forces so as to counter a U.S. NMD system and 
any TMD system covering Taiwan. They will 
also encourage China to transfer military tech-
nology to nations unfriendly to the United 
States, so as to counter a perceived U.S. con-
tainment policy and to retaliate for closer U.S. 
security ties with Taiwan. 
However, this general assessment must be 
qualified in two ways: First, Chinas prolifera-
tion policies are not entirely reactive. They are 
rooted in Beijings own independent assessment 
of its national interests, and sometimes in Chi-
nese firms own assessment of their commercial 
interests, as well as in Chinas perceptions of 
U.S. capabilities and intentions. 
And second, the fourth of these campaign 
pledges to some extent contradicts the other 
three. Although they welcome a stronger part-
nership with the United States, few if any of our 
allies in Asia are eager to see a competitive rela-
tionship between Washington and Beijing, or 
greater confrontation between Washington and 
Pyongyang. This may impose some constraints 
on U.S. policy toward China, Taiwan, and the 
deployment of an NMD system. In the same 
way, Chinas proliferation policies may be con-
strained by Beijings unwillingness to alienate 
other important partners at a time when its rela-
tions with the United States are strained. 
VERTICAL PROLIFERATION 
Chinas expansion of its own armed forces 
is motivated by two related considerations: the 
desire to wield a military option against Taiwan, 
and the determination to maintain a nuclear 
deterrent against the United States. 
United States 
For the last decade and more, China has 
been committed to the modernization and ex-
pansion of its strategic nuclear forces. This 
modernization program has at least two pur-
poses: to deter a nuclear attack on China by the 
United States or any other nuclear power; and 
to deter the United States from intervening in a 
crisis in the Taiwan Strait, even with conven-
tional weapons. From the Chinese perspective, 
a more effective deterrent would require more 
strategic weapons, with greater accuracy, longer 
range, and greater survivability. However, Chi-
nese efforts in this regard will be constrained to 
some degree by its adherence to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
Unless carefully designed to allay Chinese 
concerns, a U.S. national missile defense system 
would require China to make further efforts to 
achieve that same level of deterrence. China 
would be expected either to overwhelm the 
NMD system by building more missiles and 
deploying various penetration aids; to circum-
vent the system by developing other forms of 
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deterrence against the United States; or to dis-
able the system by attacking the satellites and 
computer systems that lie at its heart. It is, of 
course, impossible to know whether China 
would engage in more vertical proliferation in 
response to a U.S. NMD system than it would 
otherwise. However, logic suggests that China 
would require more strategic forces to feel 
equally confident about its deterrence posture 
with an U.S. NMD system in place than with-
out it. 
Moreover, allaying Chinese concerns will be 
harder if the United States continues officially 
to portray China as a strategic competitor rather 
than as a strategic partner. Having declared the 
United States to be in a competitive strategic 
relationship with China, it will be extraordinarily 
difficult to persuade Beijing that the NMD sys-
tem is not intended to degrade its deterrent. 
This problem will be exacerbated by the fact 
that growing numbers of U.S. security analysts 
explicitly argue that NMD should be designed 
with Chinas nuclear forces in mind, as well as 
those of the so-called rogue states. 
If China responds to an U.S. NMD system 
by increasing its vertical proliferation, there 
could well be ripple effects throughout Asia. 
Japan, presently ambivalent about acquiring its 
own NMD system, would be more likely to 
seek one. India would likely perceive the need 
for expanding its own strategic forces. Even 
more nations would feel less secure as relations 
between the United States and China deterio-
rated. 
To some degree, these prospective follow-
on effects could serve as a constraint on both 
the United States and China. Allied reaction 
may cause the United States to go more slowly, 
or less fully, in the direction of an NMD sys-
tem. A concern about regional reaction could 
also limit Chinas response to such deploy-
ments. However, the prospect for a strategic 
arms race between the United States and China, 
transforming the security relationship into ri-
valry, cannot be excluded. 
Taiwan 
China is also developing the capability to 
exert military pressure against Taiwan. The 
principal mechanisms Beijing seeks to develop 
include missile attacks (demonstrations, attacks 
on military targets, attacks on civilian targets), 
blockade, invasion, and quite possibly informa-
tion warfare as well. 
In the past, Chinas principal motivation in 
this regard was to deter Taiwan from a unilat-
eral declaration of independence, or from sig-
nificant steps in that direction. More recently, 
however, China seems to be returning to a pol-
icy option it had largely set aside after 1979: the 
use of force to compel unification of Taiwan 
with the mainland. 
Again, China seems to be undertaking these 
options largely independent of U.S. policy. Its 
main concern is with the declining support for 
unification and the rising support for independ-
ence among the Taiwanese public, as a result of 
both demographic change and democratic tran-
sition. 
However, changes in U.S. policy toward 
Taiwan could reinforce Chinas determination 
to develop these military capabilities. Specifi-
cally: 
(1) A less conditional commitment to Taiwans 
security, as proposed by some members of 
the incoming Bush Administration, might 
lead Taiwan to the conclusion that the 
United States would support, or at least tol-
erate, a unilateral declaration of independ-
ence by Taipei. 
(2) Provision of a TMD system to Taiwan 
probably would lead China to try to try 
overwhelm, disable, or circumvent it. 
(3) U.S. declarations that Beijing is a strategic 
competitor would reinforce suspicions in 
China that the United States has a strategic 
interest in preventing unification of Taiwan 
and the mainland, out of fear that this 
would strengthen a potential strategic rival. 
These considerations could well lead Beijing to 
develop more military options against Taiwan 
than otherwise would be the case. 
HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION 
China has engaged in the horizontal prolif-
eration of various kinds of nuclear and military 
technology. According to the latest CIA report 
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on the subject,* it continues to provide Pakistan 
with production technology for short- and me-
dium-range missiles, and has cooperated in the 
past with Pakistans nuclear weapons program. 
It has provided civilian nuclear power plants 
and naval surface-to-surface missiles to Iran, 
and was sanctioned by the United States for 
supplying technology related to chemical weap-
ons production to that country. Over time, it 
has been a major supplier of weapons and mili-
tary technology to North Korea. Most recently, 
a Chinese firm has been accused of assisting 
Iraq strengthen its anti-aircraft defenses. Al-
though not all of these activities violate interna-
tional regimes, they run counter to U.S. 
interests with regard to nonproliferation as well 
as U.S. policies toward the specific countries in 
question. 
China has many independent interests in 
this kind of horizontal proliferation. First, Chi-
nese firms have an economic interest in the 
profits to be made from export. (Thus, some 
Chinese officials have implied that, even if Chi-
nese firms were involved in upgrading Iraqs 
anti-aircraft, they did so for commercial reasons 
without the knowledge or approval of the 
Cheese government.) Moreover, Beijing has an 
interest in using arms sales and technology 
transfer as an instrument of its regional strate-
gies. China may, for example, see technology 
transfer to Iran as part of a strategy for counter-
ing the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in 
Central Asiaa development that could have 
negative implications for the security of Chinas 
northwestern provinces. Similarly, China has 
seen its assistance to Pakistans missile and nu-
clear weapons programs as a way of counterbal-
ancing Indias dominant influence on the South 
Asian subcontinent. 
However, a portion of Chinese behavior 
can be interpreted as a reaction to recent U.S. 
policy. As early as 1992, after the U.S. sale of F-
                                                 
* Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified 
Report to the Congress on the Acquisition of Technology 
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ad-
vanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 
June 2000 (Washington, DC: Central Intelli-
gence Agency, 22 February 2001), <http:// 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_
2001.htm>. 
16s to Taiwan, Beijing indicated that it would 
use proliferation practices as retaliation for in-
creased U.S. arms sales to Taipei. And in recent 
years, and particularly after the NATO inter-
vention in Kosovo, China has complained 
about what it variously calls U.S. hegemony 
or a U.S. attempt to create and maintain a uni-
polar world. Sales of military technology to 
states unfriendly to the United States is part of 
Chinas response, although Beijing has thus far 
refrained from adopting an overtly antagonistic 
posture toward Washington. Given this pattern, 
China could be expected to increase horizontal 
proliferation activities, in response to increased 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, or in response to 
U.S. declarations that its strategic relationship 
with China has become competitive. 
Again, Chinas behavior in this regard will 
be constrained by international regimes and by 
international opinion. In general, Beijing does 
not wish to be seen as blatantly violating inter-
national regimes that embody a universal or 
near-universal international consensus. It will 
also be more careful about actions that irritate a 
broad cross-section of international opinion, as 
distinct from those that would be primarily op-
posed only by the United States. Thus at this 
point, for example, China is more likely to in-
crease arms sales and technology transfers to 




(1) China has independent motives for hori-
zontal and vertical proliferation, just as 
America has independent motives for con-
sidering a NMD system for the United 
States and TMD systems for its allies. 
(2) However, China would be more likely to 
increase its proliferation activities in the 
event of U.S. declarations that the United 
States is engaged in strategic competition 
with China, increased U.S. commitments or 
arms sales to Taiwan, or U.S. deployment 
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(3) Thus, there is a real danger of an action-
reaction cycle, in which China interprets the 
policies of the new administration as an at-
tempt to block its emergence as a major 
power, and Chinas responses reinforce the 
emerging U.S. perception of a rising China 
as a threat to U.S. interests. World opinion 
could be a brake on this process. Few in 
Asia want to see a further escalation of ten-
sions in U.S.-China relations. In this sense, 
the Bush Administrations desire to 
strengthen relations with its allies could 
conflict with its declarations of a competi-
tive relationship with China. 
Recommendations 
(1) Return to the stated objective of building 
toward a cooperative relationship with 
China, but insist that cooperation
including on proliferation issuesmust be 
reciprocal. 
(2) On that basis, seek to gain Chinese under-
standing and acceptance of any U.S. NMD 
system, and configure that system to permit 
China (like Russia) an appropriate assured 
deterrent. 
(3) Seek a modus vivendi in the Taiwan Strait, 
in which restraint in provision of U.S. arms 
(including a TMD system) can be ex-
changed for restraint in Chinese military 
deployments and for a more flexible Chi-
nese position on the terms of unification. 
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CHINA AND NONPROLIFERATION: 
THE CHANGING CONTEXT 
by Brad Roberts 
Institute for Defense Analyses* 
 
CORE PROPOSITION 
If we are to fully understand the role of 
China in the global nonproliferation effort and 
the impact of U.S.-PRC bilateral relations on 
the nuclear future, we must expand our terms 
of reference. Let us consider three levels of 
analysissome of which is largely intellectual 
terra incognita. The opportunities are numer-
ous, but in the short term at least the challenges 
may well prove more numerous and significant.  
NONPROLIFERATION 
The first level of analysis is that of nonpro-
liferation as traditionally defined, with a focus 
on Chinas role as a source of transfers of 
weapons and militarily-sensitive technologies 
related to WMD and missiles. Over the last 
decade, substantial progress has been made in 
bringing Chinas behaviors into compliance 
with international norms and U.S. preferences. 
Today, Chinas behavior could still be better, as 
it continues to supply some sensitive items to 
countries of concern. But its behavior could 
also be worse, whether through transfer of 
banned items to a larger number of countries, 
or in larger volumes or of higher sensitivity, or 
merely through transfer of items of concern to 
the United States but where no treaty obligation 
exists (e.g., cruise missiles to Iran). 
Opportunity 
Chinas membership in the relevant treaty 
regimes provides an excellent venue to coordi-
nate with Chinaand for pressuring it on spe-
cific transfers of concern. Its pending 
membership in the WTO promises also to cre-
ate mechanisms for strengthening transparency 
                                                 
* The views expressed here are the authors 
personal views and should not be attributed to 
IDA or any of its sponsors. 
in its trade practices as well as its capacity to 
manage especially sensitive trade. 
Challenges 
(1) Although committed in principle to non-
proliferation, Beijing and Washington have 
different levels of interest in specific prob-
lems, and Beijing often seeks to exploit that 
difference by linking its proliferation 
behaviors to U.S. behaviors of concern, 
especially over Taiwan. This challenge 
promises to grow more prominent. 
(2) Chinas view of sovereignty as absolutely 
sacrosanct directly conflicts with its role as 
a Security Council guarantor of the effec-
tive functioning of the regimes, as in Iraq.  
(3) China views the United States as under-
performing its own obligations within the 
treaty regime, whether as a result of a dou-
ble-standard as it turns a blind eye to its 
friends, its unwillingness to walk back from 
Cold War-vintage nuclear strategies, or the 
a la carte approach to its CWC obligations, 
the CTBT, etc. 
U.S.-PRC NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP 
The second level of analysis focuses on de-
velopments in the U.S.-PRC strategic nuclear 
relationship and their impact on nuclear futures 
in Eurasia. For the sake of brevity, let us pro-
ceed from the premise that this relationship is 
somehow separable from the U.S.-Russia-China 
triangle, a premise that is not entirely valid but 
is widely held in the U.S. community. The cen-
tral question is how the U.S. move to deploy 
defenses will intersect with Chinese moderniza-
tion (and Russias re-embrace of nuclear weap-
ons). 
As Americans now well know, TMD de-
ployments to Taiwan are of deep concern to 
Beijing. This is so not primarily for operational 
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reasons, as the PRC can readily overwhelm any 
defense that Taiwan can afford, but for political 
ones: TMD will reinforce the evident drift to-
ward independence by Taipei and negate what 
Beijing views as the stabilizing effect of its mis-
sile deployments as a deterrent to independ-
ence. In Beijings view, this will increase 
significantly the prospects for war over Tai-
wanand with it the prospects for armed con-
frontation with the United States. The fact that 
Washington holds Beijing to MTCR standards 
while supplying missile and anti-missile capabili-
ties to Taiwan and other U.S. friends points to 
possible Chinese renewal of missile exports of-
fensive to Washington as a short-term expedi-
ent. 
Americans are also now coming to terms 
with Chinas concern about NMD. The impact 
of NMD on China will have two implications 
relevant to proliferation. The first is the impact 
on the perceived reliability and effectiveness of 
Chinas own deterrent. Beijing is deeply moti-
vated to build up its nuclear force quantitatively 
and qualitatively so that it can be seen to deliver 
at least 20 warheads onto U.S. targets, and thus 
presumably to be in a game of mutual coercion 
during a Taiwan crisis, rather than one-sided 
U.S. coercion. (Chinese experts are intimately 
familiar with past U.S. nuclear threats over Tai-
wan and other bilateral disputes.) If the United 
States chooses to construct a defense with the 
explicit purpose of negating Chinas deterrent, 
there is a significant prospect of an of-
fense/defense arms raceor at least a jog in 
that direction. A competitive U.S./PRC de-
fense/offense modernization process would 
have significant effects on Asia. In South Asia it 
would likely accelerate Indian nuclear plans, and 
in East Asia it would have a chilling effect on 
U.S. relations with friends and allies. It would 
also impact Moscows perceptions of the re-
quirements of nuclear stability around its own 
periphery, reinforcing perhaps the impulse to 
regenerate an INF force (which would have 
repercussions for U.S. allies in Europe and U.S. 
interests in Eurasia more generally). 
The second impact of NMD derives from 
what the Chinese perceive to be U.S. pursuit of 
absolute security through BMD. In their view, 
Washington has its eye firmly on that time a 
decade or two hence when Russia, China, or 
both (or some other power) will emerge as that 
long-expected peer competitor. Thus they 
believe that the United States is pursuing de-
fenses as a way to escape the balance of power, 
so that it is free to pursue its interests in Eurasia 
and in fact to promote its own version of the 
Brezhnev doctrine (i.e., to use force to prevent 
rollback of democracy). Chinese experts and 
officials actively debate a much broader prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction, and 
perhaps also defense countermeasures, as a way 
to promote development of an anti-U.S. coali-
tion. The center of gravity in this debate 
shifted significantly with the Belgrade embassy 
bombing. 
Challenges 
The challenges on this second level of 
analysis are almost too numerous to mention. 
They are both conceptual and political. Concep-
tually, neither Washington nor Beijing has 
thought much about the impact of develop-
ments in their strategic relationship on the lar-
ger nuclear question in Eurasia. In Washington, 
almost no thought has been given to the nature 
of the nuclear relationship with China that best 
serves U.S. interests, and among those who 
have devoted some thought, opinion is deeply 
divided. Politically, there appears to be little 
willingness in either country to explore the sta-
bility implications of current policy preferences 
or alternative trajectories. Both countries appear 
headed toward harder lines on Taiwan, which 
brings with it not only a heightened risk of war 
but also the possibility of war under the nuclear 
shadow, which potentially could have far-
reaching implications for the future of the non-
proliferation effort. In both capitals there is also 
a political price to be paid for trying to under-
stand the interests of the other and to explore 
approaches that meet common interests. One 
last challenge is the sharp disparity in interest in 
this offense/defense dynamic, with a near-
obsession in Beijing and near-contempt in 
Washington. 
Opportunity 
But there is also a real opportunity: the ad-
vent of a new administration in Washington 
means there is a moment for dialogue. Beijing 
enters its own period of political transition a 
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year from now, with the October 2002 Com-
munist Party Congress where nearly 60% of the 
Politburo will turn over. Those engaged in 
Track 2 level activities have called repeatedly 
for a new cycle of strategic dialogue at Track 1, 
and in Beijing at least there is interest in such an 
effort, though quite preliminary. If the debate 
can be won in both capitals, a new dialogue on 
strategic stability might be possible. 
NUCLEAR FUTURE OF  
NORTHEAST ASIA 
The third level of analysis is that of North-
east Asia. The prospect of Korean unification, 
whether sooner or later, brings with it some 
fundamental questions bearing on the nuclear 
future in the subregion. Will a reunified Korea 
be oriented politically and strategically toward 
the United States or China, or will it pursue 
neutrality, or seek a large role of its own? Will it 
possess nuclear weapons? What regional secu-
rity order will succeed the present system? Will 
U.S. forces remain in Korea or in the region 
more generally? 
And will a nuclear Korea lead to a nuclear 
Japan? There are many signs today of a debate 
in Japan about its future nuclear status, a debate 
that is moving to new terms but largely behind 
closed doors, as it is in significant measure a 
debate about Washingtons credentials as a se-
curity guarantor. Some Japanese experts are 
increasingly direct in their argument that U.S. 
mismanagement of the Korean issue in a way 
that produces a nuclear-armed Korea, and of 
the U.S.-PRC BMD issue in a way that pro-
duces an increase in nuclear tension in the re-
gion, could lead directly to a break in the U.S.-
Japan alliance, and to Japanese acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. 
In China there is a rising perception that 
the U.S. presence is no longer necessary to 
handle the Japanese nuclear problem. Chinese 
experts believe published reports that Japan 
could be capable of deploying a nuclear force in 
183 days (!), with some Japanese experts con-
veying to them the notion that such a force 
would consist of 100 or so cruise missiles 
equipped with advanced fission warheads. Many 
Chinese experts seem not particularly con-
cerned about the advent of a nuclear-based re-
gional security order in Northeast Asia, as they 
view such weapons as essentially political in 
nature. The disparity of views between Chinese 
and U.S. experts on this point is striking. 
Opportunities 
(1) To sustain the various processes vis-à-vis 
North Korea with an eye toward verifiable 
cessation of its WMD and missile pro-
grams. 
(2) To build on that foundation to bring into 
being a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the 
subregion. 
(3) To broaden and deepen the nascent trilat-
eral and quadrilateral security dialogues at 
both the Track 1 and Track 2 levels. 
Challenges 
(1) Washingtons reassertion of the central role 
of its bilateral alliances in the subregional 
security order brings with it inevitably a 
question about how also to promote multi-
lateral processes, as well as a question about 
how to exploit the foundation provided by 
those alliances for a larger subregional pur-
pose. 
(2) Sensitive nuclear questions are emerging at 
a time of apparently growing friction in 
both the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-ROK po-
litical relationships, frictions that may rein-
force those who argue internally that the 
United States cannot be fully relied on in 
the long term to protect their interests. 
CHALLENGES TO A  
PRODUCTIVE AGENDA 
These three levels of analysis suggest a 
transformation of the role of China and U.S.-
PRC relations in achieving nonproliferation 
aspirations. There are three additional chal-
lenges to moving forward productively on this 
broader agenda. 
First, in both countries the debate about 
the intentions of the other has been largely poi-
soned by developments over the last few years. 
In Washington there is a price to be paid for 
attempting to delineate and understand Chinas 
interests. In Beijing the United States-as-
hegemon theme is deeply engrained. This 
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points to the urgency of a strategic dialogue but 
also the real challenge of sustaining it. 
Second, there are many reasons to think 
that the Bush administration is going to start 
out with a weak commitment to multilateralism 
in general, and to arms control in particular. In 
the East Asian context, the impact of these pol-
icy preferences is as yet dimly understood. But a 
weakening of the multilateral processes there 
and of the global treaty regimes seem likely to 
make it far more difficult to address the chal-
lenges in the nuclear realm. 
Third, both governments seem pro-
grammed to mis-respond to unanticipated de-
velopments in the policies of the other. Beijing 
cannot in any circumstance appear weak or to 
be kowtowing to hardliners in Washington. 
Washington seems chronically to pay too little 
attention to a top-down management of U.S. 
regional security strategy. In both countries 
pragmatists keep a wary eye on hardliners and 
have other interests at stake in not antagonizing 
them. 
A closing observation about the risks of 
sloganeering: U.S. analysts and officials are of-
ten bemused by the role of slogans in Chinas 
policy debate and public posture. We should be 
careful in our own right not to reduce complex 
relationships to oversimplified slogans. Today, 
the slogan common in U.S. policy circles is that 
the countries are strategic competitors but eco-
nomic partners. Taking a long-term perspective, 
China and the United States are both partners 
and competitors. Moreover, there may be more 
potential partnership in the security realm than 
the economic one. Our common interests in 
regional security orders that are stable and non-
nuclear may bring into being a far deeper pat-
tern of cooperation. But our competing inter-
ests in the economic realm may become far 
more pronounced in the coming decade. So let 
us look beyond slogans to come to a more nu-
anced appreciation of the multiple currents of 
cooperation and confrontation in the bilateral 
relationship. 
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NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS TERRORISM: 
ASSESSING RISKS AND CRAFTING RESPONSES 
by John Hamre 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
 
Paraphrasing Dickens, the decade of the 
1990s was the best of times and it was the worst 
of times. The long, dangerous Cold War era 
came to an end. None of us thought we would 
live long enough to see a peaceful resolution to 
the deadly standoff between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. The peaceful collapse of a mod-
ern military empire is still an unprecedented 
event in history. But the end of the Cold War 
and the collapse of the Soviet bloc also engen-
dered the dangers of our day. 
We now live with the terrible residue of the 
Cold War. The Soviet Union built mountains of 
chemical, nuclear and biological weapons, and 
assembled an astounding industrial infrastruc-
ture to develop and build these terrible devices. 
As the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia 
struggled to pick up the pieces, the old infra-
structure decayed. While ongoing production is 
in doubt, there are persistent reports of 
continuing development activities in all three 
areas. And where activities were curtailed, scien-
tists and technicians remain idle, with doubtful 
prospects for future employment. Some of 
those scientists have moved on to other coun-
tries where their skills can be compensated. The 
end of the Cold War thus left a dangerous mix 
of technical knowledge and economic privation. 
The Cold War also created a dangerous 
perception on the part of some countries that 
they could garner the political value of nuclear 
weapons on the cheap by developing or acquir-
ing chemical and biological weapons. As a con-
sequence, in the 1990s some 14 or 15 countries 
pursued and, we believe, retain active chemical 
and biological weapons programs. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union with its 
vast arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons stocks, and the spread of NBC pro-
grams to other countries raises the fear that 
such devices inevitably will fall into the hands 
 
of terrorists. Over the past three years, there 
have been many troubling reports of special 
packages moving through the logistics chan-
nels of terrorist organizations. While we have 
no certain way of knowing the content of these 
packages, the prospect of NBC terrorism can-
not be ignored. In the closing days of 1999, I 
spent hours in the Situation Room in the White 
House participating in coordination and plan-
ning meetings for what we were certain would 
be a millennium attack, most probably using a 
crude chemical device.  
Growing technological sophistication 
around the world, and a widening knowledge of 
the engineering of pathogens and chemical 
agents, is creating homegrown terrorists capable 
of developing crude and inefficient chemical 
and biological weapons. The Internet now con-
tains recipes for chemical and biological weap-
ons. The chemical attack in the Tokyo subway 
system demonstrated at minimum that at least 
one organization felt no moral constraints in 
using chemical weapons. 
The conditions are present for terrible de-
velopments in this decade. The collapse of con-
trol over existing arsenals, the proliferation of 
materials and knowledge, and the heightened 
political cachet of such weapons create a dan-
gerous mix. It should be noted that theory is 
one thing and practice is another. While sophis-
ticated programs are capable of engineering 
deadly cocktails of chemical and biological 
agents, the tasks associated with weaponization 
generally go beyond the skill of amateurs. As 
such, we confront two dimensions to the prob-
lem. First, how can we enhance control over 
government-sponsored NBC programs, and 
limit the spread of these materials and tech-
niques to others? Second, what can we do about 
crude devices manufactured by sick amateurs? 




THREAT REDUCTION ACTIVITIES 
First, I believe we must strengthen and 
broaden the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
program. The success of the CTR program is 
well known. Less well known are the con-
straints imposed on the Administration by the 
Congress. Congress effectively blocked the 
Administration from implementing the CTR 
program for anything but strategic nuclear 
weaponsarguably the most secure weapons in 
the Russian arsenal. Specifically, the Govern-
ment was blocked from extending the CTR 
program to tactical nuclear weapons. The Ad-
ministration also attempted to use CTR funds 
to initiate a demonstration demilitarization pro-
ject for chemical weapons. That project was 
stymied initially by Russian bureaucratic intran-
sigence, and ultimately by U.S. congressional 
opposition. 
I believe there are two directions that 
should be taken. First, I believe the CTR pro-
gram should be directed against biological ca-
pabilities in Russia. The chemical stockpiles are 
dangerous, but do not present the existential 
threat posed by biological devices and technol-
ogy. This is a difficult task because Russia con-
tinues to mask the biological weapons program 
that it has undertaken in violation of its arms 
control commitments. It is hard to help a coun-
try curb a program it denies conducting. None-
theless, using CTR funds to divert the human 
talent currently devoted to biological weapons 
is critical, in my judgment. 
Second, I believe we should confront our 
European allies with their responsibility to un-
dertake CTR-like programs aimed initially at 
controlling and ultimately dismantling tactical 
nuclear inventories. Our European allies have 
effectively sat on their hands over the past eight 
years as the United States has conducted the 
most successful threat reduction program in 
history. Rather than piously intoning familiar 
nonproliferation creeds, our allies should be 
challenged to get their hands dirty in the serious 
business of cooperative threat reduction em-
phasizing tactical nuclear weapons. Last year, 
the United Kingdom budgeted $150 million 
over three years for CTR-like activities. While 
modest, this is an encouraging first step. It 
should be extended to other European coun-
tries and greatly expanded.  
STIGMATIZING USE OF CHEMICAL 
AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
Despite the reprehensible nature of these 
weapons, there is a surprising lack of passion in 
the traditional arms control communities about 
confronting them. The loathing of nuclear 
weapons continues unabated, yet there is not 
comparable passion about biological and 
chemical weapons. Indeed, during the past five 
years, most public discussion of chemical and 
biological weapons came from the defense pre-
paredness community. When the U.S. Defense 
Department called for mandatory inoculation of 
its soldiers against anthrax, the public reaction 
was one of skepticism. The bulk of public de-
bate questioned technical efficacy or the unin-
tended side effects of the vaccine rather than 
the threat posed by widespread weaponization 
of anthrax. The first thing I would commend to 
the new Bush Administration is to coordinate 
an aggressive international campaign to stigma-
tize chemical and biological weapons. 
NEW APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE 
I believe the Administration should take a 
new approach to intelligence collection and as-
sessment on chemical and biological weapons. 
Ironically, the intelligence enterprise often limits 
understanding. I recall the episode when the 
United States struck a Sudan pharmaceutical 
plant in retaliation for the terrorist strikes on 
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In ret-
rospect, the intelligence base for the planned 
strike was limited. Open-source searches in 
subsequent days revealed information that was 
not available to the intelligence community at 
the time of the mission planning. 
As pointed out in the Rumsfeld Commis-
sion report, the process of compartmentaliza-
tion often prevents the sharing of information. 
A small cadre of analysts and interpreters will 
try to cover the world, and will produce impres-
sive but limited information on potentially sus-
pect activities. Yet open sources often provide 
far greater information, more quickly, and with 
expanded opportunities for corroboration. A 
more open process to information collection 
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and sharing (ban the word intelligence) is 
crucial, in my mind, to a richer understanding 
of this dynamic world. I would encourage the 
new Administration to create open-source in-
formation gathering on WMD proliferation 
activities as a starting point to a new approach 
to intelligence. 
REVITALIZE INTERNATIONAL 
EXPORT CONTROLS ON WMD 
MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY 
The international export control process 
has become bogged down in activities that are 
choking the system and preventing effective 
control of WMD materials and technology. The 
United States has an export control system as 
elaborate as that of any country, yet the bulk of 
its resources are devoted to licensing and moni-
toring trivial activities. The growing controversy 
over ineffective and inefficient export controls 
entails heightened danger that ill-conceived re-
form efforts could weaken control over truly 
important and dangerous materials and know-
how. 
The Bush Administration should make ex-
port control reform a high priority, with a cen-
tral goal to refocus international control efforts 
on those technologies and materials needed to 
produce nuclear, chemical and biological weap-
ons. It is interesting to note that to export a 
five-ton truck requires months-long clearance 
of license applications, but there are no licenses 
at all required to export genetic-sequencing ma-
chines. 
ENHANCING COLLABORATION 
BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
The new era of transnational terrorism and 
transnational communications exposes the con-
tradictions in current government constraints 
on the intelligence community and on the law 
enforcement community. I witnessed first hand 
the difficulties posed in tracking international 
terrorist activity where elements of the terror 
network were inside the United States. Intelli-
gence collection had to stop as soon as the elec-
trons entered the United States. Law 
enforcement lacks the coordination culture and 
procedures developed in the U.S. intelligence 
community. 
In the closing days of the Clinton Admini-
stration, the President signed a new directive 
for counterintelligence coordination, CI-21. A 
comparable program to coordinate law en-
forcement and intelligence activities was 
launched in the mid-1990s, but it has been inef-
fective for a range of reasons. At present, the 
CI-21 initiative is in suspended animation, 
awaiting the arrival of a new government that 
did not participate in its creation. It is unclear if 
the new Administration will embrace CI-21 or 
abandon it as just an initiative of the previous 
administration. 
Irrespective of the precise mechanism, in 
this era of transnational terrorism, the govern-
ment will require new structures and procedures 
to reconcile the impediments found in the U.S. 
form of constitutional control over law en-
forcement and intelligence to protect privacy, 
while at the same time permitting timely inter-
agency coordination. 
NEW RESEARCH ON DETERRENCE 
For many years, the use of chemical and 
biological weapons has been deterred by the 
fear of unacceptable responses by the victims. 
The 1990s, however, witnessed sad new devel-
opments that bring in question deterrence 
against CBW use. Iraqs use of chemical weap-
ons against Iran seems to have created a per-
verse incentive for Iran to build its own arsenal 
of chemical and biological weapons. The 
United States has openly implied that it will use 
nuclear weapons to retaliate against any country 
that uses chemical or biological weapons against 
U.S. troops or interests. Unfortunately, such 
threats tend to reinforce the view that chemical 
and biological weapons might be a cheap 
counter-threat against nuclear intimidation. I 
personally question the ethics of such threats. Is 
it acceptable for the United States to threaten 
retaliation against innocent civilians if their 
government foolishly uses chemical weapons to 
attack U.S. military forces engaged in combat? I 
have my doubts. Obviously, actual circum-
stances would determine the acceptability of 
such steps. 
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I also question how one can deter the use 
of chemical and biological weapons by organi-
zations that lack the fixed infrastructure that 
they value more than attacking the United 
States. For example, how does the threat of 
nuclear retaliation deter Osama bin Ladin and 
his terror network? I believe considerable en-
ergy needs to be devoted to deterrence theory, 
especially for non-state actors. At present we 
have only folklore and supposition to guide our 
thinking. More systematic work needs to be 
undertaken.
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ASSESSING THE THREAT 
The threat of a biological attack is usually 
either underplayed or exaggerated, in part be-
cause its probability is so difficult to assess. In 
Washington, the debate about the likelihood of 
such an attack usually reflects one of three 
schools of thought. First, there is the not if but 
when group, which believes that because hu-
man beings are inherently aggressive and be-
cause no weapon invented has not been used, it 
is only a question of time before a state or ter-
rorist group launches a major attack against an 
American target at home or abroad. Hence, 
advocates of this view argue, the federal gov-
ernment should spend massively on homeland 
defense, and launch multifaceted programs 
aimed at protecting Americans against an inevi-
table threat. 
By contrast, proponents of the second 
school argue that because a bio-attack is much 
harder to carry out than is commonly under-
stood, it is unlikely that an aggressor will try to 
conduct one. Therefore, they reason, the United 
States should not spend much countering what 
is at best an improbable threat. 
The third schoolwhose motto is low 
probability, but high consequencesreflects 
reasoning that I believe the Clinton Administra-
tion ultimately adopted. This middle-ground 
between doomsayers and optimists holds that 
the United States must take practical, cost-
effective steps to protect American military 
forces and civilians against even the improbable 
event of a bio-attack, because the damage in-
flicted could be devastating. 
MIXED RESPONSES 
Consistent with the low-probably, high-
consequence perspective, in the latter half of 
its second term in office the Clinton Admini-
stration launched a series of major homeland 
defense initiatives aimed at protecting Ameri-
cans against bio-threats. Among other meas-
ures, the administration created Americas first 
national stockpile of vaccines and antibiotics; 
increased basic research in microbiology and 
genomics; and expanded the training of so-
called first responders: the police, firefighters, 
and other law enforcement and public health 
officials who would have to cope with an at-
tack. Finally, it intensified efforts to negotiate a 
protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons and 
Toxins Convention (BWC) to give the treaty 
teeththat is, an enforcement and verification 
mechanism aimed at deterring cheaters. 
Launched primarily in 1998, the administra-
tions effort had many strengths but also many 
weaknesses. In the first year, the stockpile ef-
fort, for instance, got roughly half the money 
that a group of private experts had recom-
mended to the White House as the minimum 
for a serious program. And while the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
and the Pentagon both got additional money 
for germ research, much of the new homeland 
defense money went to government contractors 
and/or to create or expand rapid-response 
teams and other highly dubious missions. The 
debacle of the National Guard Civilian Sup-
port Teams, for example, is well documented 
in a stunning report by the Pentagon Inspector 
Generals office.* In addition, the administra-
tions program to vaccinate more than two mil-
lion uniformed military personnel became a 
fiasco, due to the inability of the nations sole 
anthrax vaccine plant in Michigan to produce 
enough vaccine safely and efficiently for the 
militarys needs. 
                                                 
* Office of the Inspector General, U.S. De-
partment of Defense, Management of National 
Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support 
Teams, Report No. D-2001-043, (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 31 January 2001), 
<http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/fy0
1/01-043pt1.pdf>. 
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COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 
In marked contrast to these unfortunate ef-
forts, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
programs have produced quiet scientific and 
diplomatic achievements. These efforts have 
not only helped prevent former Soviet scientists 
from going to work for rogue states or terror-
ists, but also provided the United States with far 
greater understanding of the Soviet Unions 
massive germ warfare effort. 
So far, the Bush Administration seems to 
have been slow to acknowledge the threat 
posed by germ weapons of mass destruction. 
The dissemination of germs would probably 
not be deterred by construction of the national 
missile shield so dear to the new administra-
tions strategic thinking. The Bush White House 
apparently would not agree that germs, rather 
than split atoms, are likely to become the un-
conventional weapons of choice in the 21st 
Century. But fearing American retaliation, ter-
rorists or rogue states would probably prefer 
not to launch a missile with a return address 
against the United States. They would probably 
prefer to attack U.S. citizens and the U.S. econ-
omy surreptitiously through unannounced, un-
claimed covert actions involving germs or 
toxins. 
Some Bush Administration officials have 
also been critical of the CTR program, warning 
that Russian scientists may be using technology 
and information gleaned from cooperation with 
American scientists to bolster what they charge 
is the Russian militarys continuing effort to 
develop germ weapons. Clearly there are risks 
inherent in such scientific exchanges. But a dis-
interested review of the programs accomplish-
ments so far suggests that the benefits of the 
programs substantially outweigh those risks. 
Since the Soviet Union was far ahead of the 
United States in several key areas of bio-
weaponry, the Pentagons CTR program is not 
a favor to Russia but rather a service to U.S. 
national interests in stemming the flow of bio-
warfare related expertise and technology to un-
desirable parties, and in deepening U.S. under-
standing of what Soviet germ weaponeers were 
able to accomplish. 
As far as homeland defense is concerned, 
the Bush Administration seems unlikely to rein-
force the Clinton Administrations belated ef-
fort to improve the nations dilapidated public 
health care surveillance and treatment networks, 
a key, but often overlooked part of defending 
the nations military and civilian populations 
against germ attacks. Another false step was the 
administrations early decision to abolish the 
post its predecessors had created on the Na-
tional Security Council to monitor the national 
security impact of health issues and infectious 
diseases. An outbreak of foot-and-mouth dis-
ease or mad cow disease (Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy-BSE) in the United States
whether naturally occurring or the result of a 
deliberate attackwould have dramatic eco-
nomic and psychological consequences for the 
nation, far beyond the purview of the depart-
ments of HHS or Agriculture. Americans would 
want to know what had happened and hear 
what the administration was doing to protect 
Americans, not from a cabinet officer, but from 
the White House and the president himself. 
MAKING THE PRESS 
PART OF THE SOLUTION 
An issue that was largely ignored by the 
previous administration, and one that I predict 
is destined to be ignored by the Bush Admini-
stration as well, is what if any role the press 
should play in highlighting the growing threat 
of germ weapons as a result of technological 
advances and political developments. Some of-
ficials in both administrations have advocated a 
policy of benign neglect with respect to germ 
security and the press: in effect, they argue, no 
news is good news. Many officials have justi-
fied their resistance to candid discussion of the 
bio-weapons threat on grounds that it might 
give terrorists and rogue states ideas that they 
did not already have, and hence could encour-
age such attacks. But given our democracy, 
Americans are unlikely to accept further in-
creases in bio-defense spending, or intrusions 
into personal health such as mandatory anthrax 
vaccinations, absent such a debate. 
It is irresponsible to leave the education of 
Americans about the bio-weapons threat to 
Hollywood and to pulp thriller writers. The 
time for a frank, dispassionate and public de-
bate about the threat of bio-terrorism is long 
overdue.
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In recent years, bureaucratic factors have 
hampered the effective implementation of U.S. 
nonproliferation policies in Russia. Corrective 
action can and should be undertaken by the 
Bush Administration. This paper briefly reviews 
existing coordination problems and considers 
how agencies have adapted to compensate. 
Noting the evident costs of this imperfect adap-
tation, the paper outlines how a well-
functioning interagency process would boost 
policy effectiveness. In particular, it emphasizes 
the importance of the interagency working 
group on nonproliferation, stressing that it 
should meet regularly and be chaired by the 




tion programs in Russia have been operating 
without an organized interagency process. 
There are four problems in this regard. First, 
coordination of programs occurs largely 
through ad hoc agency-to-agency contacts, of-
ten based on good professional relationships 
among key actors, both at the political and ca-
reer levels. These relationships provide at best a 
partially effective glue for coordination. Sec-
ond, established groups dealing with specific 
programs (such as the NSC-chaired group over-
seeing the HEU deal) meet infrequently and 
usually only in response to a pending deadline 
or crisis. Third, the interagency working group 
for nonproliferation does meet, although on an 
irregular basis and also in response to pending 
deadlines (such as a group leaving for a negotia-
tion) or crises. Finally, discussions and decisions 
(e.g., minutes of meetings) frequently are not 
communicated, thus leaving meeting results 
open to various interpretations. 
Agencies implementing the nonprolifera-
tion programs have adapted to these problems, 
but only imperfectly. The agency-to-agency 
contacts noted above have sometime evolved 
into regular weekly meetings, conference calls, 
or invitations to interagency colleagues to at-
tend program staff meetings. An important ex-
ample is the DOD-DOE group on MPC&A-
WPC&A. At times, and in response to particu-
lar requirements, special interagency working 
groups have been established that have func-
tioned quietly and successfully. The State De-
partment-chaired group implementing the 
program to develop alternative employment for 
former BW scientists is a notable example. To 
create important new initiatives, the interagency 
process has come together not only to develop 
the substance but also to sell the programs, first 
to the Office of Management and Budget, then 
on Capital Hill (e.g., the FY 1999 Expanded 
Threat Reduction Initiative-ETRI). All of these 
adaptive measures, however, have a certain 
ad hoc quality to them. 
Moreover, the United States continues to 
pay a price for this Balkanization. First, it has 
become increasingly difficult to generate coher-
ent support for Presidential policy and national 
strategy through the instrument of these pro-
grams. In 1994, a coherent package of Nunn-
Lugar projects helped to create adequate incen-
tives for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to 
give up their nuclear weapons. Such coherence 
for a Presidential policy priority would be diffi-
cult to achieve today. 
Second, there is always the danger of dupli-
cation creeping into the cracks between pro-
grams, which our foreign partners stand ready 
to exploit. For example, Russian entities are not 
above selling the same planning document or 
engineering study twice. 
Third, unless communicated among rele-
vant agencies, methods and procedures devel-
oped by one agency for working effectively with 
our foreign partners do not benefit the other 
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agencies working on similar programs. These 
include procedures for efficient contracting, 
funds transfers, and access to facilities. Again, 
our partners can exploit inconsistencies among 
U.S. agencies. 
Fourth, unusual program approaches are 
not held up to scrutiny except on a piecemeal 
or even accidental basis, since there is not a 
regular discussion of standards of policy im-
plementation. This is not a matter of corrupt 
practices, but rather one of ensuring that each 
agency has consideredand discussed to-
getherthe pros and cons of a particular ques-
tion. For example, should we be training guards 
at Russian nuclear facilities? Various answers 
are possible, and merits and liabilities need to 
be explicitly examined. Regarding this particular 
question, we should consider carefully both that 
the problem of ill-trained guards is urgent and 
has resulted in bad incidents at facilities, but 
also that we would be adding to Russian mili-
tary capabilities. 
Finally, disputes between and among agen-
cies tend to go unresolved. Although bureauc-
racies usually function with a certain degree of 
rancor, long-standing disputes with no means 
or process for resolution can impact programs 
in dangerous ways, such as inviting killer leg-
islation or severe budget cuts. 
A FUNCTIONING INTERAGENCY 
PROCESS 
Resolution of these problems requires a 
functioning interagency process, not a nonpro-
liferation tsar. Although the notion of a tsar 
in the White House to oversee and direct the 
nonproliferation programs is perennially popu-
lar, it is unnecessary. Indeed, a tsar and his or-
ganization would risk usurping the increasingly 
efficient implementation activities of the re-
sponsible agencies. Organizational reform is 
needed, however, to create and sustain a func-
tioning interagency process. 
(1) The primary difficulty is not in the man-
agement of implementation, but in the 
management of policyat the first level, in 
ensuring the Presidents priorities are 
served; at the second level, in ensuring that  
 
 
the funds for these programs are expended 
efficiently, effectively, and with a minimum 
of rancor among agencies; and at the third 
level, in ensuring that practical policy ques-
tions (e.g., training guards) are examined 
coherently, and with a practical result for 
policy implementers.  
(2) A functioning interagency process requires, 
first of all, an interagency working group 
(IWG) that meets regularly under the 
chairmanship of the responsible NSC Sen-
ior Director. This is the group that should 
focus on ensuring that the Presidents pri-
orities are served. 
(3) The Bush Administration might also adapt 
and develop some of the successes of the 
ad hoc system that has evolved over the 
past six years. For example, the focused 
working group model, such as that devel-
oped for former Soviet BW scientists, 
might be further developed and extended 
to other programs. Such groups need not 
be located in the NSC. Ideally, their chair-
manships should be shared out among 
agencies, and indeed, that is somewhat the 
case with the ad hoc system that exists to-
day: e.g., State taking the lead on the BW 
group; Defense leading on the plutonium 
production reactor shutdown group; DOE 
heading up the working group on MPC&A 
cooperation with the Russian Navy. For 
these threads to be brought together, how-
ever, these groups should report regularly and in a 
single forum to the IWG chair. 
(4) There should also be an interagency 
surge capability to confront particular 
problems (e.g., an unfavorable GAO re-
port) or to develop and sell new initiatives 
(e.g., the ETRI). For these purposes, the 
surge group should have the ability to 
rapidly convene press, budget, and legisla-
tive assistance from the various agencies. 
(5) Cross-cutting technical implementation 
issues, such as how to make contracting 
more efficient, might be handled by an in-
teragency technical issues group. Again, 
however, such a group should report regu-




The Bush Administration has maintained a 
Senior Director in the NSC to oversee U.S. 
nonproliferation programs, but has assigned 
additional responsibilities to the position. Com-
bining Proliferation Strategy, Counterprolifera-
tion, and Homeland Defense in one portfolio 
may convey the Bush Administrations priori 
 
ties, but also implies diminished emphasis on 
nonproliferation programs. This may pose a 
new bureaucratic impediment to effective policy 
direction and oversight. Moreover, the chal-
lenges to effective counterproliferation and 
homeland defense policies are likely to mount, 
unless we effectively implement strong nonpro-
liferation programs in Russia. 
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NEAR-TERM PROLIFERATION 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
A number of proliferation challenges were 
identified in Combating Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, the final report of the Commis-
sion to Assess the Organization of the Federal 
Government to Combat the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by John 
Deutch. These threats continue to undermine 
not only the international nonproliferation re-
gime, but also international security and stability 
more broadly, and almost certainly will be high 
on the list of policy concerns for the new ad-
ministration. 
North Korea 
Perhaps the major challenge currently fac-
ing both the international regime and global 
security is that posed by the ongoing North 
Korean nuclear and missile programs. North 
Korean missile and technology transfers are 
highly destabilizing in many areas of the world, 
but the domestic developments get the most 
attention. As the details of the Agreed Frame-
work (AF) come increasingly into focus, im-
plementation may become more difficult. A 
South Africa-like model of full disclosure and 
full access remains a distant hope, but the 
IAEA will need similar access and cooperation 
before it can be concluded that North Korea 
has relinquished its nuclear weapon ambitions. 
An important problem will be agreeing on what 
must be inspectednot only what existed at 
the time of the AF signing, but all sites that 
have since been identified. The plutonium that 
would be generated in the LWRs once they are 
constructed may not be a major problem, but a 
broader issue that must be resolved is whether 
the reactors should even be constructed in the 
first place. Furthermore, the possible provision 
of non-nuclear power as a substitute for the 
nuclear power sacrificed by North Korea in the 
AF is also subject to contentious dispute. 
Iraq 
As Iraq seeks to free itself from U.N. Secu-
rity Council obligations, few analysts would be 
surprised if Saddam Hussain continues his in-
terest in acquiring nuclear weapons in contra-
vention of Iraqs pledges as a non-nuclear 
weapon signatory to the NPT. Although it ap-
pears that the United States and United King-
dom may be losing the propaganda war over 
sanctions, it is clear that Hussain has refused to 
use the funds available to meet Iraqs domestic 
needs. The suffering in Iraq may be used as 
evidence that the sanctions regime is mali-
cious. In fact, the refusal to spend the funds 
available underscores Hussains own indiffer-
ence to Iraqs domestic well being. Some ad-
justments may need to be made, however, as 
recently suggested by U.S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, in order to ensure the return of 
IAEA inspectors, without which Iraq will cer-
tainly defy U.N. resolutions and return whole-
heartedly to WMD production and deployment. 
Iran 
Despite its good standing as an NPT mem-
ber, significant concern continues to surround 
Irans WMD aspirations. Given the evidence 
unearthed by UNSCOM about Iraqs WMD 
programs; Pakistans nuclear tests and claims to 
be a nuclear weapons state; and the ongoing 
presence of Russian, Chinese and U.S. military 
forces along its perimeter; Irans motivation for 
acquiring WMD may be readily understood. 
Irans security dilemma is therefore the context 
for its interest in acquiring advanced nuclear 
equipmentheavy water reactors, AVLIS and 
centrifuge technology, etc. Iran also is spending 
hundreds of millions of dollars on a rebuilt nu-
clear power plant even while it flares natural gas 
as a waste product of oil drilling. Irans nuclear 
trade with Russia reinforces suspicions that Te-




WMD Diversion from the FSU 
The possibility that excess and poorly pro-
tected Russian nuclear material may fall into the 
hands of terrorists worries many proliferation 
analysts in the West. However, this concern 
does not appear to be entirely shared by offi-
cials within Russia. A leading candidate for such 
terrorist behavior might be a rebel from 
Chechnya who would threaten nuclear use 
against Russia if it did not cease military action 
in the province. Yet the Russian governments 
increasingly relaxedeven defiantapproach 
to export controls suggests it feels it is immune 
to the problem. Nevertheless, inadequately pro-
tected fissile material, unpaid security guards, 
and destitute nuclear scientists may combine to 
allow nuclear material or weapons to leave the 
country and reach the hands of new prolifera-
tors or terrorists. Whether doubling, tripling
or even quintuplingthe several hundred mil-
lion dollars currently being expended by the 
United States will solve this problem, however, 
ultimately depends on Russian behavior, not on 
the funding level per se.  
Chinese Nonproliferation Policy 
The Chinese government has repeatedly 
reassured U.S. administrations that it takes the 
NPT injunctions against nuclear transfer seri-
ously. Doubts persist, however, as North Korea 
and Pakistan continue to develop WMD 
capabilities, which in some cases appear to 
exceed their indigenous capabilities. China 
irately denies that it has broken any laws, while 
countering that the United States has done too 
little to punish India for starting the nuclear 
arms race in South Asia with its May 1998 
nuclear tests. A recent CIA report to Congress 
about worldwide proliferation activitiesas 
reported by the Washington Times on 27 Feb-
ruary 2001argued, however, that China was 
providing missile technology to Pakistan, Iran, 
North Korea and Libya, and might still be 
assisting Pakistans nuclear program.  
Terrorist/Third Party Acquisition & Threat 
Although the primary concern about terror-
ist seizure of nuclear materials is connected 
with the possibility that fissile material may leak 
out of Russia, the problem could arise else-
where. Recent press reports that Osama Bin 
Laden tried to acquire uranium reinforce ongo-
ing concerns that WMD smuggling may lead to 
a nuclear terrorist threat. Furthermore, in-
creased global competition may impoverish 
some states that would turn to nuclear smug-
gling to make ends meet. In addition, radical 
states may also support terrorist action as a sur-
rogate for their own interests, such as Irans 
support for Hizbollah. With communications 
and weapons cheap and available, even radical 
individuals or movements may seek to attack 
prominent international symbols. 
ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS FOR 
NONPROLIFERATION 
The Deutch Report 
Efforts under the Clinton Administration 
to cope with WMD proliferation contributed to 
the formation of a special commission to evalu-
ate whether the U.S. Government was ade-
quately organized to confront the threat. 
Beyond the organizational issues, a number of 
shortcomings were identified in U.S. nonprolif-
eration policy. For example, nonproliferation 
policies were often initially opposed, and then 
not implemented by the regional bureaus; anti-
proliferation efforts increased policy decentrali-
zation and thereby added to policy incoherence; 
economic sanctions, though sometimes a useful 
lever, were overemphasized; too many Con-
gressional committees had overlapping respon-
sibilities; and too much time was spent 
addressing proliferation events that had already 
occurred rather than developing strategies for 
future contingencies. The Deutch Commission 
therefore concluded that the efforts of the 
U.S. government to combat proliferation today 
are neither effective nor command an appropri-
ately high policy priority in the Executive 
Branch. The Commission evaluated new 
measures that might be taken as well as organ-
izational improvements that might be made to 
improve the situation. 
While recognizing that the WMD Commis-
sion was expressly tasked with organizational 
issues, a number of commissioners argued that 
adding new resources to existing programs and 
focusing only on organizational structure would 
not be sufficient to meet the WMD challenge. 
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One commissioner, Henry Sokolski, later 
commented: if our policies are unsound or 
incomplete, no amount of reorganization is 
likely to help, and the implementation of bad 
policies could well make matters worse. The 
Commission identified a set of problems
included in the first part of this paperwhich 
would require policy attention and recom-
mended that an Executive Order be issued es-
tablishing a new organization in the person of a 
National Director for Combating Proliferation. 
The Directorreferred to as the nonprolifera-
tion tsarwould chair a new Combating Pro-
liferation Council, have substantial budgetary 
and policy authority, report directly to the 
President and accept a broad set of responsibili-
ties: 
• inform the president and the vice-president 
• prepare reviews, directives, and decision 
papers 
• organize meetings on proliferation 
• report annually to the president 
• join proliferation-related meetings, even 
with heads of state 
• lead the interagency process 
• act as spokesperson and coordinator 
• develop a plan to address WMD prolifera-
tion 
• construct a coordinated budget 
• consult with Congress 
Brief History 
This encompassing set of tasks recalls the 
work of prior tsars. In a sense, the first nonpro-
liferation tsar served in President Jimmy 
Carters Administration. As a candidate, Carter 
was especially concerned about this issue area 
and appointed Harvard University Professor 
Joseph Nye to be Deputy Under Secretary of 
State and the principal point man for what was 
then largely a prospective problem. The NPT 
was in place, but after the Indian test in 1974 a 
set of supplier issues and controls had emerged, 
which fell under Nyes supervision. When 
President Reagan took office, the issue re-
cededindeed Reagan had opined that prolif-
eration might be none of our business. 
That sentiment notwithstanding, prolifera-
tion issues demanded attention and Ambassa-
dor Richard Kennedy was handed the portfolio 
in the State Department. Even more a tsar than 
Nye, Kennedy took his role seriously. He in-
sisted that his position be equivalent to a Dep-
uty Secretary and chaired a series of interagency 
meetings to which he invitedand expected to 
attendAssistant Secretaries from the relevant 
offices and agencies. His counselor, Lewis 
Dunn, moved from Kennedys office to be-
come Assistant Director of ACDA and was 
replaced first by Richard Gronet, on rotation 
from NSA and then by Gary Samore, on rota-
tion from LLNL. For years when the Reagan 
administration was criticized for doing too little 
about proliferation, Kennedy willingly acted as 
a lightening rod, responding to questions from 
Congress, providing cover for regional bureaus, 
and taking flak at international forums such as 
the IAEA. 
With the arrival of President Bush in 1989, 
Kennedys office was downsized and the task-
ing moved to the NSC. At NSC, however, 
those in charge had less power than Ambassa-
dor Kennedy at State because security policy 
was less of a prime focus. With the end of the 
Cold War, nonproliferation became much more 
interesting to a variety of government offices. 
Iraqs massive WMD undertaking, exposed as a 
consequence of the Gulf War, represented for 
many the defects and shortcomings of prior 
nonproliferation policy. Thus as the Clinton 
Administration assumed power in 1993, argu-
ments were made that counter-proliferation 
should either replace or supplement what was 
seen to be the ineffectual approach of nonprolif-
eration. Soon there were many chefs in the pro-
liferation kitchen, but the result was a diverse 
and idiosyncratic policy stew. The defeat of the 
CTBT in the U.S. Senate and the addition of 
India and Pakistan as overt nuclear weapon 
states in May 1998 soon eclipsed the successful 
permanent extension of the NPT.  
What Next? 
There is no question that the new admini-
stration takes WMD proliferation seriously and 
wants to see greater communication, coordina-
tion, and integration across the bureaucracy. 
Regardless of how the new administration or-
ganizes itself to meet this problem, however, 
certain principles enunciated in the Deutch 
Neil Joeck 
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Commission report may provide valuable guid-
ance:  
• presidential leadership  
• accountability among cabinet officers  
• NSC-level responsibility  
• alignment of departmental with presidential 
priorities 
• integration across the government 
An important element in leadership has al-
ready been demonstrated, as President Bush has 
appointed a strong foreign policy team at NSC, 
State, and Defense. As noted above, the Deutch 
Commission argued for a formally established 
Director with budgetary and policy authority. 
The well-focused individuals already in place 
would be unlikely, however, to welcome a new 
source of authority whose power would include 
line-item oversight of their budgets. The new 
administration may therefore emphasize policy, 
without ignoring important organizational re-
quirements. 
The contours and components of the over-
all policy are yet to be enunciated, but some 
organizational outlines are coming into focus. 
National Security Presidential Directive 1 has 
been issued and organizes the National Security 
Council. As reported by Inside Defense on 2 
March 2001, policy coordination committees 
will address eleven functional areas: 
• democracy, human rights, and international 
operations 
• international development and humanitar-
ian assistance 
• global environment 
• international finance 
• transnational economic issues 
• counter-terrorism & national preparedness 
• defense strategy, force structure, and  
planning 
• arms control 
• proliferation, counterproliferation, and 
homeland defense 
• intelligence and counterintelligence 
• records and information security 
Policy coordination committees will also 
cover six regions: 
• Europe and Eurasia 
• Western Hemisphere 
• East Asia 
• South Asia 
• Near East and North Africa 
• Africa 
WMD proliferation issues clearly will be 
addressed by Proliferation, Counterprolifera-
tion, and Homeland Defense but may also fig-
ure to some extent in committees addressing 
terrorism, defense strategy, arms control, and 
intelligence. Proliferation is a prominent issue in 
a number of regions as wellIraq and Iran in 
the Near East and North Africa, North Korea 
in East Asia, and India and Pakistan in South 
Asia. A difficult problem in any administration 
is integrationas Stephen Hadley put it, real 
integration into a strategy thats greater than the 
sum of its partsand integration across these 
committees will be an important challenge.  
Integrating proliferation policy clearly will 
be an important challenge not only within the 
NSC but also across the administration. In this 
regard, the tasks proposed by the Deutch 
Commission for the proliferation tsar
itemized on p. 36 abovewill almost certainly 
become important requirements. The president 
and vice-president will require detailed, fully 
vetted policy proposals that will form the basis 
for presidential directives and decision papers. 
Proposals from State, Defense, Commerce, En-
ergy, and other agencies may have important 
proliferation consequences. Meetings and inter-
agency discussions to evaluate those conse-
quences will have to be guided and coordinated. 
Some attention will have to be paid to the 
budgetary implications of, for example, re-
newed attention to counterproliferation. And 
Congress will continue to want to be consulted 
and to provide counsel.  
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STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR 
U.S. NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES IN RUSSIA 
by Leonard Spector 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
 
The United States now implements more 
than a dozen distinct nonproliferation programs 
in Russia to reduce the risk of nuclear materials 
or expertise falling into the hands of terrorist 
organizations or states of concern. While ap-
plauding the goals and accomplishments of 
these activities, outside observers repeatedly 
have expressed concern about the lack of coor-
dination among these efforts. For example, the 
lead recommendation of the recently released 
report of the Secretary of Energy Advisory 
Board panel (chaired by Lloyd Cutler and Sena-
tor Howard Baker) was for formulation of a 
strategic plan for securing and/or neutralizing 
all nuclear weapons-usable material located in 
Russia.* 
By using the approach described below, the 
Bush Administrations National Security Coun-
cil and Office of Management and Budget 
could easily undertake a strategic planning 
process to improve coordination of U.S. non-
proliferation programs in Russia. The process 
would permit U.S. policy-makers to exploit syn-
ergies and facilitate tradeoffs among these U.S. 
programs, while focusing diplomatic and budg-
etary resources more efficiently. 
PROPOSAL 
This paper proposes development of side-
by-side, multi-year projections of the expected 
impacts of all U.S. programs addressing specific 
Russian nonproliferation challengesin prac-
tice, a set of detailed spreadsheetscoupled 
with observation of trends and utilization of 
what if analyses. 
                                                 
* Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, A Report 
Card on the Department of Energys Nonproliferation 
Programs with Russia, (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Energy, 10 January 2001) 
<http://www.hr.doe.gov/seab/rusrpt.pdf>. 
Although the approach seems simple and 
rather self-evident, it has never been employed 
by U.S. Government agencies or non-
governmental organizations working in this 
arena. Indeed, it is common for U.S. nonprolif-
eration programs in Russia to operate without 
accounting for impacts of related programs. 
The point is well illustrated on the website of 
the Department of Energy Material Protection 
Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program. 
There, in December 2000, the program pro-
jected the amount of material it must secure in 
Russia over the next eleven years, without re-
flecting the increases in the inventory during 
this period from Russian fissile material produc-
tion and weapons dismantlement activities, and 
without reflecting the impact of U.S. programs 
to eliminate fissile material. A February 2001 
projection provided to the Government Ac-
counting Office of the materials to be secured 
by the program modified the overall number, 
but again treated this inventory as static.* 
FISSILE MATERIALS IN RUSSIA 
The United States conducts three types of 
programs to address fissile material prolifera-
tion risks in Russia. The first type aims to elimi-
nate such material. Programs in this group include 
the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase 
Agreement; the Material Protection Control and 
Accounting (MPC&A) Material Consolidation 
Program; and the Plutonium Disposition Pro-
gram. The second type of program is designed 
to end production of new fissile material and includes 
                                                 
* U.S. Department of Energy, Office of De-
fense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Summary of 
Recent Accomplishments, <http://www.nn. 
doe.gov/accomplishments.shtml>; General 
Accounting Office, Nuclear Proliferation: Security 
of Russias Nuclear Material Improving; Further En-




the Plutonium Production Reactor Shut-Down 
Program and the newly launched Civil Pluto-
nium Moratorium Program. The third category 
of programs works to secure fissile material not 
contained in weapons, i.e., the MPC&A Program 
and construction of the Mayak Fissile Material 
Storage Facility. 
The proposed side-by-side annual projec-
tion would: 
(1) track annual increases in the overall inven-
tory of Russian fissile material at risk (for il-
lustrative purposes, here presumed to be 10 
metric tons (MT) of fissile material annually 
from new weapon dismantlement for six 
years, and roughly three MT of new pluto-
nium production for a number of years un-
til production-termination programs are 
implemented in 2004-2006); 
(2) track annual decreases from that inventory 
(for example, the 30MT of HEU annually 
that is sold under the HEU Purchase 
Agreement and, beginning in 2007, the two 
MT/year eliminated through the Plutonium 
Disposition Program); and 
(3) forecast the impact on the net inventory of 
U.S.-sponsored security improvements (an 
average of 47MT/year secured under the 
MPC&A program through 2011, and 50MT 
of plutonium placed in the Mayak Fissile 
Material Storage facility from 2002-2006).  
The illustrative chart on p. 40 depicts these 
data. The illustration assumes that most of the 
HEU to be purchased under the HEU Purchase 
Agreement has already been removed from 
weapons through the dismantlement process 
over the past ten years, and is part of the 
603MT of fissile material not in nuclear weap-
ons that is currently under the coverage of the 
MPC&A program. Although based on data re-
quiring additional refinement, this illustrative 
government-wide analysis shows that the 
MPC&A program might be able to complete its 
full security upgrades on all Russian fissile ma-
terial of concern earlier than the date estimated 
by the MPC&A programs February 2000 inter-
nal, stand-alone analysis, which places this end 
point in 2011. 
The graph also shows a what if alterna-
tive, illustrating the impact of blending down 
HEU at a rate of 50MT per year rather than at 
the current rate of 30MT per year, until the re-
maining 390MT to be purchased have been 
rendered harmless. The 50MT/year option, 
suggested by Dr. Thomas Neff of MIT, could 
accelerate the securing of all at-risk material by 
an additional year, given the above assumptions. 
BUDGET/UNIT-COST ANALYSES 
A similar year-by-year analysis that tracked 
program impacts against annual budgets to pro-
vide unit-cost data could allow improved judg-
ments regarding resource allocations. Building 
on the above what if case, such a unit-cost 
approach could, for example, help determine 
the extent to which the additional costs of rapid 
blend-down might be offset by the avoided 
costs to the MPC&A program that might ac-
crue from reduction in the quantity of material 
to be secured. 
Other analyses could show the avoided-
cost savings to the MPC&A and Plutonium 
Disposition Programs that would accrue from 
early cessation of production of additional plu-
tonium; these savings might more than offset 
the costs of interim measures to halt new pro-
duction, such as paying a fee for summertime 
shut down of the remaining plutonium produc-
tion reactors. 
JOB CREATION ANALYSES 
A crosscutting approach would also en-
hance city-by-city planning for U.S. job-creation 
programs in Russia. New job requirements 
based on Ministry of Atomic Energy down-
sizing plans would be compared not only to job 
creation efforts under the Nuclear Cities Initia-
tive and Initiatives for Proliferation Program, as 
is now the case, but also to jobs created 
through the International Science and Technol-
ogy Center and all other U.S. government activities 
in the relevant cities, including, for example, the 
Plutonium Disposition and MPC&A Programs. 
U.S. programs that may cause job losses, such 
as the Plutonium Production Reactor Shut-
Down Program and the Civil Plutonium Mora-
torium (which will lead to the closure of certain 
reactors and reprocessing facilities) would also 
be tracked to calculate the overall, net impacts 
of U.S. programs on employment, city by city. 
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THE PATH FORWARD 
Many gaps exist in the analyses sketched 
above. Comprehensive analyses would require 
extensive work to collect necessary data and 
would need to use a range of projections, rather 
than a single one, for each scenario. 
However, the overall approach is sound, and 
could provide wide-ranging opportunities for 
systematically assessing and improving U.S. 




























Total HEU & Pu not in weapons (HEU purchased @ 30MT/yr)
HEU/Pu secured (comprehensive upgrades or equivalent)
Total HEU & Pu not in weapons (HEU purchased @ 50MT/yr)
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CRITICAL CHOICES, FATEFUL CONSEQUENCES 
by Michael Barletta* 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
 
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS 
Weapons of mass destruction pose clear 
and present dangers to the security of the 
United States of America. While nuclear weap-
ons have constituted an existential threat to this 
country and its population for decades, biologi-
cal weapons may be a comparable menace to-
day or in the near future. Paradoxically, some of 
the United States greatest strengths as a na-
tionranging from its proud tradition as an 
open society, to its impressive scientific and 
technical ingenuity, to its global military pre-
dominanceincrease its vulnerability to WMD 
threats. 
A single scenario can illustrate some of the 
dangerous challenges facing the United States. 
If the U.S. government or the America people 
were attacked with smallpox, it is far less likely 
that this diabolical agent would be delivered by 
an intercontinental ballistic missile than by an 
individual walking through an airport. In the 
event of such an assault, the public health sys-
tem might not recognize the outbreak before 
being overwhelmed with casualties. U.S. intelli-
gence and law enforcement agencies may be 
unable to identify the assailant, or even deter-
mine whether the strike was launched by a for-
eign organization or government, or an  
 
                                                 
* This discussion is based in part on the delib-
erations of the Monterey Nonproliferation 
Strategy Group in its 15-16 March 2001 meet-
ing, which considered draft versions of papers 
in this publication. A list of the participants
who engaged in not-for-attribution discussions 
as individuals rather than as institutional or na-
tional representativesfollows. Although the 
groups discussions encompassed a very wide 
range of issues and perspectives, this review 
focuses quite narrowly. In developing this pa-
per, I have sought to draw upon the sense of 
the members deliberations, but am alone re-
sponsible for their specific expression here. 
American terrorist group. One conceivable 
purpose of such an attack could be to provoke 
U.S. military action against a third party, which 
would involve deliberate creation of a false train 
of evidence leading away from the true perpe-
trators. In such a scenario, one of the most 
powerful U.S. efforts to deter such an attack
implicitly threatening to retaliate against a CBW 
attack with nuclear weaponsmay play into its 
adversaries hands. What should the United 
States do if Osama bin Laden and his ruthless 
accomplices in al Qaeda use biological weapons 
against the United States in an effort to provoke 
a U.S. nuclear attack against an Arab and/or 
Muslim country? Can U.S. national security be 
entrusted to the patriotism of Russian biowar-
fare specialists who enjoyed privileges in Soviet 
times, but now may face unemployment as well 
as lucrative offers to sell some of what they 
know to the likes of bin Laden? 
WMD proliferation also threatens U.S. 
friends and allies abroad, as well as China, Rus-
sia, and many other states. Despite this impor-
tant commonality in national interests, however, 
recent years have witnessed a sharp decline in 
international cooperation to meet these threats, 
most notably demonstrated by ongoing divi-
sions among the permanent members of the 
U.N. Security Council over UNSCOMs efforts 
to disarm Iraq of WMD, and tacit international 
acquiescence to overt nuclear proliferation in 
South Asia.  
Nonproliferation specialists in the United 
States and allied countries are deeply concerned 
that in the absence of determined and effective 
U.S. leadership, dangerous regional situations 
will deteriorate, global regimes will be under-
mined, and WMD risks will mount with poten-
tially fateful consequences for U.S. and 
international security. The choices that the Bush 
Administration makes in its first year in office 
will be critical in generating positive or negative 
developmentsand perhaps bothin prolif-
eration affairs. 
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This review highlights three issues challeng-
ing the new administration: WMD legacies in 
the former Soviet Union, U.S. relations with 
China, and biological weapons terrorism. It also 
highlights an approach that the Bush Admini-
stration should consider employing to curb 
WMD threats: mobilizing small ad hoc coali-
tions of like-minded states to address specific 
problems, such as that which the Reagan and 
Bush administrations employed to stem ballistic 
missile proliferation in the 1980s. 
Soviet Legacies 
The nuclear and biological weapons that 
the Soviet Union created to threaten the United 
States have outlived the political system that 
produced them. Nuclear warheads and unse-
cured fissile materials, as well as BW facilities, 
technologies, agents, and experts in Russia and 
the former Soviet Union continue to endanger 
the United States, despite the considerable suc-
cess of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) programs launched in 1991 
under President Bush. This bipartisan campaign 
has eliminated, reduced, or secured more mate-
rials threatening the United States than any 
arms control agreement reached to date, and 
has done so at relatively small cost in compari-
son with overall U.S. defense expenditures. 
Their contributions to U.S. national secu-
rity notwithstanding, CTR activities undertaken 
during the Clinton administration were too lim-
ited in scope and ambition. As contributors to 
this collection observe, Soviet biowarfare tech-
nologies far outstripped U.S. defensive coun-
termeasures, and neutralizing the capabilities 
still remaining in Russia is imperative to protect 
the United States. The Bush Administration 
should expand CTR programs with Russia to 
more fully address threats posed by the biologi-
cal weapon legacies of the massive Soviet BW 
program. The administration should also con-
sider developing measures for effective ac-
counting and control of ballistic missile-related 
assets in Russia. Another useful initiative would 
be a joint U.S.-Russian effort to repatriate to 
Russia the Soviet-origin fissile material currently 
abroad, especially that residing in Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. Further-
more, the executive branch needs a pragmatic 
results-oriented approach for rationalizing U.S. 
nonproliferation activities in Russia, one that 
can not only foster greater fiscal discipline, but 
also avoid unintended negative consequences of 
bureaucratic insularity in programmatic imple-
mentation. European contributions to CTR 
efforts are increasing, and the Bush Administra-
tion should make every effort to press U.S. al-
lies to share the financial and programmatic 
burdens entailed in securing deadly Soviet lega-
cies. 
Fissile material management and BW non-
proliferation must remain central to U.S.-
Russian efforts. However, Russian export of 
sensitive technologies to Iran is also a critical 
issue. Without Russian restraint on WMD-
relevant trade with Iranespecially in the areas 
of missile technology, materials, and exper-
tisethe security environment of several sub-
regions will be destabilized. The Clinton Ad-
ministration was unable to win adequate Rus-
sian restraint in this regard. The Bush 
Administration must do better, because Iran is a 
critical link in the WMD proliferation chain 
stretching between South Asia, Central Asia, the 
Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the Mediter-
ranean. 
Sino-American Relations 
Much is at stake in U.S. relations with 
China. The impact of bilateral relations on 
Chinas policies regarding nuclear and missile 
technology exports, nonproliferation regimes, 
and the U.N. Security Council make this rela-
tionship critical to containing WMD prolifera-
tion. U.S.-China relations are directly pivotal for 
East Asia, but may have indirect but powerful 
bearing on prospects for nonproliferation in the 
Middle East, Russia, and South Asia. 
For both sides, unfortunately, nonprolifera-
tion is routinely subordinate to other concerns. 
The status of Taiwan is of far greater priority 
for China, while missile defense in effect 
trumps other U.S. security priorities bearing on 
China. Due to current disputes over both is-
suescomplicated by generational change un-
derway among the Chinese political 
leadershipChina and the United States may 
be headed for a nuclear offense-missile defense 
competition, or even direct military conflict. 
Some specialists on China believe that if the 
United States were to explicitly commit to sup-
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porting Taiwans independence, doing so would 
entail accepting war with China. Most nonpro-
liferation specialists concur with the unclassified 
estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies, that al-
though some degree of Chinese nuclear mod-
ernization will proceed regardless of U.S. 
policies, U.S. deployment of NMD probably 
will spur an order-of-magnitude increase in 
Chinese strategic nuclear forces. Ultimately, 
however, the fact that the number of Chinese 
thermonuclear warheads targeting U.S. cities 
may increase by scores or hundreds could be 
the least of U.S. concerns. 
The proliferation impact of confrontational 
U.S.-Chinese security relations may include re-
newed or expanded Chinese missile exports to 
the Middle East, and expanded production and 
deployment of Chinese intermediate-range nu-
clear-armed ballistic missiles. European analysts 
fear the latter move might lead Russia to renege 
on the INF Treaty, which could in turn have an 
unpredictable impact on Turkey. A U.S.-
Chinese nuclear offense-missile defense compe-
tition likely would encourage India to step up 
its nuclear weapon and missile development 
and deployment programs, which would en-
courage Pakistan to respond in kind, which 
would reverberate via Iran to the Persian Gulf 
and Middle East. Thus the stakes for missile 
and nuclear nonproliferation in many regions 
could depend indirectly on how the United 
States and China traverse this difficult passage 
in bilateral relations. The least recognized but 
perhaps most directly consequential military-
technical variable in this complex equation is 
whether China develops, deploys, or even ex-
ports anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) to counter 
space-based U.S. NMD assets. If China were to 
take this countermeasure, it could effectively 
put U.S. conventional force projection capabili-
tieswhich are heavily reliant on satellite-based 
intelligence and communicationsat risk 
around the globe.* 
                                                 
* In a special session in March 2000, the Mon-
terey Nonproliferation Strategy Group sought 
to forecast potential consequences of NMD 
deployment, considering a paper by James Clay 
Moltz, The Impact of National Missile De-
fense on Nonproliferation Regimes, later pub-
lished in the Nonproliferation Review 7(3): 61-74. 
However, there remain grounds for opti-
mism that these cascading proliferation scenar-
ios can be averted. The international political 
and regional security costs to China of prolif-
eration countermoves would be significant, and 
across-the-board confrontation with the United 
States would entail painful economic costs and 
lost opportunities for China. Moreover, al-
though change in the Chinese leadership is 
stimulating nationalism and may increase mili-
tary autonomy in defense matters, the incoming 
generation was trained not in the USSR but in 
the West, and economists reaching power are 
apt to be trade-oriented reformers. Common 
interests in expanding U.S.-China commerce 
will encourage moderation on both sides of the 
relationship. On balance, the leadership change 
in Beijing provides an opportunity for a serious 
strategic dialogue with Washington. 
Thus, the Bush Administration faces stiff 
challenges but also enjoys considerable discre-
tion in shaping the future of Sino-American 
relations. In defining policy and engaging 
China, U.S. officials should work to reach a 
sober, shared assessment of common security 
interests with regard to WMD proliferation. 
Both countries security will suffer if relations 
degenerate into a zero-sum, defense-offense 
contest. Neither country can realistically hope 
to escape mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack 
except through the others forbearance. Un-
compromising gambits to do so inevitably will 
harm the two countries common interests in 
averting nuclear proliferation and ballistic mis-
sile development by Japan, eventually by a re-
unified Korea, as elsewhere. 
Bioterror 
Seventeen years ago, a religious cult in Ore-
gon perpetrated the first large-scale use of a 
biological agent against a U.S. population, dis-
seminating pathogenic bacteria by contaminat-
ing the salad bars of ten restaurants, which 
sickened at least 751 people. Fortunately, no 
one died in that attack, and since then it largely 
has been forgotten. The United States might be 
equally lucky in a future attack involving bio-
logical agents. Alternatively, a future assault that 
used contagious pathogens might be as lethal as 
the Spanish Flu pandemic that swept across the 
United States in 1918, infecting over one-
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quarter of the population, and killing at least ten 
times as many Americans as all of the U.S. ser-
vicemen who died fighting in the First World 
War. 
It is hard to identify another issue in U.S. 
national security affairs and the international 
context marked by such a glaring gulf between 
potential magnitude and relative neglect of the 
threat. In recent years, the United States has 
undertaken significant steps toward prevention 
and preparedness for bioterrorism. However, 
the pace of change in U.S. vulnerabilities and in 
potential adversaries access to lethal capabilities 
is likely outstripping U.S. responses. Mounting 
anti-Americanism overseas and shocking inci-
dents in U.S. schools suggest that the number 
of groups and individuals with extreme griev-
ances is apparently on the rise. Many of the dis-
affected are undoubtedly exposed to dramatic 
bioterror scenarios by the entertainment indus-
try and mass media, and those with access to 
the Internet can download technical informa-
tion useful for conducting deadly BW attacks. 
Effectively meeting the bioterror threat will 
require intellectual as well as institutional ef-
forts, because biological weapons pose several 
distinct types of threats that differ in their na-
ture, consequence, and likelihood. Apocalyptic 
mass-casualty scenarios are hopefully the least 
likely to occur, yet by making response prepara-
tions appear insufficient their potential scale 
apparently has had something of a paralyzing 
effect on governmental officials and the health 
services. Narrowly targeted attacks, perhaps 
employing agents of limited lethality, are pre-
sumably more likely. The recent epidemic of 
hoof-and-mouth disease in Europe underscores 
the vulnerability of livestock, and demonstrates 
the economic and social impact of sudden in-
fectious outbreaks. Future episodes might in-
volve deliberate attempts at economic warfare 
or political disruption, with plant agricultural 
resources offering a similar target. 
The United States relies in large measure on 
deterrence, defense, and retaliation to thwart 
BW attacks by state actors. Analogous instru-
ment could be developed to target non-state or 
terrorist threats. To deter and retaliate against 
bioterrorism, the Bush Administration could 
promote international efforts to stigmatize the 
production, possession, and use of biological 
weapons. In addition to making BW a crime 
against humanity, the United States could pro-
mote creation of an international system to re-
ward whistleblowers and protect witnesses who 
provide information leading to interdiction of 
criminal BW activities. Furthermore, the ad-
ministration should emphasize working to im-
prove U.S. detection, identification, and 
attribution capabilitiesi.e., the forensics of 
BW.  Not only can such assets strengthen BW 
defenses, but they may also deter perpetrators 
who cannot be sure that their involvement will 
go undetected. 
Many steps that can aid in defending 
against bioterrorism are also worth undertaking 
for their contributions to public health and dis-
aster preparedness. These include defensive 
research on potential agents, stockpiling vac-
cines, and public education, as well as training 
at the federal, state, and community levels for 
consequence and crisis management. In work-
ing to stem infectious diseases such as HIV-
AIDs as well as defend against bioterrorism, the 
United States should dedicate substantial re-
sources toward creation of an effective global 
monitoring system to provide early warning and 
tracking of infectious diseases. 
BEYOND ARMS CONTROL 
AND MISSILE DEFENSE: 
COUNTER-PROLIFERATION 
COALITIONS 
Since the Cold Wars end, alternative tools 
have reinforced or supplanted traditional ap-
proaches to U.S. national security. Neither mili-
tary force nor arms control sufficed for some 
security challenges, including the uniquely ambi-
tious effort to dismantle Iraqi WMD through 
the international effort implemented by 
UNSCOM, as well as U.S. and allied CTR pro-
grams addressing Soviet WMD legacies. More 
recently, the Bush Administration has signaled 
its intent to deploy ballistic missile defenses for 
the United States and its allies, which would add 
an additional instrument to the range of U.S. 
policy options. 
Like missile defenses, bilateral arms control 
agreements and multilateral nonproliferation 
regimes are inadequate to perform all of the 
diverse tasks necessary to preserve U.S. national 
security. But there are some missions of abiding 
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significance for which these latter instruments 
are irreplaceable. Perhaps least tangible yet most 
important, nonproliferation regimes can bolster 
international nonproliferation norms that serve 
U.S. national security. The power of norms is 
often underestimated, due to the misconception 
that they should be expected to restrain current 
WMD proliferants like Iran, Iraq, or North Ko-
rea, but clearly fail to do so. But if U.S. officials 
consider only how Iraq exploited loopholes in 
IAEA safeguards and betrayed its NPT com-
mitment to disguise a covert bomb program, or 
focus solely on the Soviet Unions massive vio-
lations of its BWC commitment, then they will 
fail to understand where norms matter most: in 
shaping the behavior of potential proliferant 
states, and in strengthening U.S. leadership. 
First, norms buttress nonproliferation 
among the many states that could but do not 
apply advanced technological capabilities to 
produce nuclear weapons, and the very many 
who do not employ national assets to produce 
biological or chemical weapons. The United 
States cannot afford complacency with regard 
to the scores of potential proliferants, states like 
Japan and South Korea that now reject WMD 
and rely in part on U.S. security assurances but 
depend also on multilateral regimes to provide a 
stable security environment in which they can 
prudently remain nonproliferants. This contri-
bution will become increasingly important in 
the future, given the ongoing diffusion of sensi-
tive technologies. Obviously, in preventing 
WMD threats to the United States and its allies 
and friends, there is no better outcome than 
their nonproliferation. Worth recalling in this 
regard is the Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi Condor 
II medium-range ballistic missile project. Once 
feared as a potent proliferation threat, the elder 
Bush Administration proved that this covert 
transnational scheme could be blocked and 
dismantled through determined pressure, in 
part in collaboration with the small group of 
like-minded supplier states that created the 
MTCR. 
Second, shared values and norms provide a 
common rationale for military coalitions, collec-
tive diplomatic pressures, and multilateral re-
gimes to prevent and respond to WMD 
proliferation. They thus enable the United 
States to lead globally, by melding military and 
economic power with shared international pur-
pose in campaigns to counter WMD prolifera-
tion. This is particularly important today, as 
U.S. military and economic predominance 
arouses resentment among friends as well as 
overt hostility from adversaries. In the event 
that President George W. Bush sets out to or-
ganize a military coalition against a WMD pro-
liferant, such as that which his father mobilized 
against Iraq in 1990-1991, nonproliferation 
norms would aid the United States in garnering 
international support for decisive action. 
But winning international cooperation is 
also imperative if the United States is to suc-
cessfully meet many current and emerging 
WMD threats that cannot be addressed by 
force. Papers in this collection underscore, 
however, how difficult it has been to gain effec-
tive cooperation on nonproliferation in recent 
years, especially from Russia and China. One 
option for the Bush Administration would be to 
shift focus from inclusive and formal treaty ne-
gotiation processes, toward informal coalitions 
oriented to address distinct WMD proliferation 
threats. This approach might have the advan-
tages of allowing the United States to lead more 
effectively and to exclude problem states with 
weak or conflicting commitment to nonprolif-
eration, and could be more flexible, decisive, 
and problem-oriented than multilateral treaties 
and organizations. 
The challenge for a focused coalition ap-
proach, however, is to avoid undercutting the 
international normative framework, verification 
capabilities, and other assets gained through 
multilateral nonproliferation regimes. As the 
Bush Administration moves to lead the interna-
tional community beyond Cold War concepts 
and approaches, in employing counterprolifera-
tion coalitions or other instruments the admini-
stration can and should build upon the 
increasingly shared conviction that WMD pro-
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